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ABSTRACT 
 Naval Aviation is continually looking for ways to reduce its mishap rate.  
Recognizing a growing concern for issues related to aging aircraft, focus has expanded to 
include maintenance operations.  It is accepted that human error is a causal factor in at 
least eighty percent of all mishaps, with maintainer, line, or facility-related factors 
accounting for one out of five major mishaps.  One of several actions taken to reduce the 
mishap rate is the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS). Created to give 
Naval Aviation unit commanding officers a sense of the maintenance climate of their 
unit, the MCAS reveals the maintainers perception of safety climate.  Beginning in July 
2000, the MCAS administration became available via the Internet.  This thesis analyzes 
the results of the first 2,180 responses recorded via the Internet version of MCAS.    
Findings include: a) administration of the Internet-based MCAS yields results similar to 
the paper-and-pencil version; b) differences were detected among the participating units 
and the Model of Organization Safety Effectiveness components; c) the relationship 
between MCAS score and Incident Rate, although slightly negative, is indistinguishable 
from random variation; and d) there was no evidence that demographics bias the results.  
These findings could be accounted for by the fact that a units safety climate typically 
improves after a mishap.  Requiring all units to complete the survey annually would 
allow tracking over time to uncover trends.  One area for further research is investigating 
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions are used throughout this thesis: 
Aircraft Ground Mishap (AGM).  Those mishaps in which no intent for flight 
(intention to fly) existed at the time of the mishap and loss of an aircraft or $10,000 or 
more in damage to an aircraft or property occurred. 
Flight Mishap (FM).  Those mishaps in which there is $10,000 or greater aircraft damage 
or loss of aircraft with the existence of intent for flight for the aircraft at the time of 
the mishap. 
Flight-Related Mishap (FRM).  Those mishaps in which there is intent for flight at the 
time of the mishap and $10,000 or greater aircraft damage or loss of an aircraft, 
and/or property damage occurs. 
High-Reliability Organization (HRO).  An organization that operates in a hazardous 
environment, yet experiences few failures due to effective leadership, sound 
management policies, procedure standardization, adequacy of resources and staffing, 
and a defined system for risk management.  
Human Factors Accident Classification System  Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME).  
A taxonomic system used to classify causal factors that contribute to maintenance- 
related mishaps. 
Incidence Rate.  The total number of mishap reports or Hazard Reports per 100,000 flight 
hours. 
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS).  A 43-item survey used to gain 
insight into an aircraft maintainers perception concerning maintenance operations 
and safety within the Navy and Marine Corps Aviation. 
xvi 
Maintenance-Related Incidents (MRIs) 
Mishap.  A Naval Aviation mishap is an unforeseen or unplanned event that directly 
involves naval aircraft and which results in $10,000 or greater cumulative damage to 
naval aircraft or personnel.  Mishaps are further divided into three classes based on 
the amount of damage to the aircraft, property and personnel injury.  Mishaps are 
documented as a mishap report (MR).  The following are the definitions of the three 
classes: 
a.  Class A.  A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including 
all aircraft damage) is $1,000,000 or greater, or a naval aircraft is 
destroyed or missing, or any fatality or permanent total disability of a 
person occurs with direct involvement of Naval aircraft. 
b.  Class B. A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including all 
aircraft damage) is $200,000 or more but less than $1,000,000 and/or a 
permanent partial disability, and/or the hospitalization of five or more 
personnel occurs. 
c.  Class C. A mishap in which the total cost of property damage (including all 
aircraft damage) is $10,000 or more but less than $200,000 and/or there is 
an injury resulting in one or more lost workdays. 
 Hazard  An incident in which the total cost of property damage (including all aircraft 
damage) is less than $10,000 and no work days are lost to injury.  Hazards are 
documented as a hazard report (HAZREP). 
Naval Aircraft.  Refers to U.S. Navy, U. S. Naval Reserve, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. 
Marine Corps Reserve aircraft. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 Naval Aviation is continually looking for ways to reduce its mishap rate.  
Recognizing a concern for issues related to aging aircraft, focus has expanded to include 
maintenance operations.  It is accepted that human error is a causal factor in at least 
eighty percent of all mishaps, with maintainer, line, or facility-related factors accounting 
for one out of five major mishaps.  The Human Factors Quality Management Board 
(HFQMB) was created in 1996 to specifically address human errors in FMs.  During the 
first 18 months of its existence, the Navy FM rate dropped to its lowest point ever 
(Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee,. 1998).   Energized by these results and recognizing a 
concern for issues related to aging aircraft, the HFQMB decided to expand its focus to 
include maintenance operations (Schmidt et al. 1998). 
 To tackle human error in aviation maintenance the Naval Safety Center and the 
Naval Postgraduate (NPS) School of Aviation Safety created two tools to assess 
maintainer error, trends and other factors which contribute to an incident, including the 
units safety climate.  The first tool is the Human Factors Analysis Classification System 
 Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) developed by Schmidt, Schmorrow, and Hardee 
(1998) that classifies causal factors contributing to maintenance-related incidents (MRIs).   
The second tool is the Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS).  Baker (1999) 
used a model of safety effectiveness based on research done on High-Reliability 
Organizations, the Model of Safety Effectiveness (MOSE) and the Command Safety 
Climate Survey to create a 35-item MCAS.   Goodrum (1999), Oneto (1999), the School 
of Aviation Safety, and AIRPAC took the 35-item MCAS and developed a 43-item 
survey.  Harris (2000) and Stanley (2000) took the 43-item survey and assisted in 
xviii 
administering it to the 3rd Marine Air Wing.  Harris found that no one MOSE area or 
question dominated the outcome of the survey and  recommended changes to represent  
U. S. Marine Corps aviation units.  Stanley determined that demographic factors account 
for minimal variance in the responses and concluded that the MCAS is demographically 
unbiased.    In July 2000, the MCAS became available on-line for any Naval Aviation 
unit to take. 
 This study examines the on-line administration and tries to ascertain whether 
MCAS results differ between those units that have experienced recent maintenance-
related incidents and those that have not.  The study also examines demographic factors 
to determine if they are correlated with MCAS responses.  With the study of 2,180 
maintainer surveys from 30 Naval Aviation units, an attempt to assess the maintenance 
safety climate within each unit is made.  
 Principal component analysis does not identify any one MOSE component or 
question that was responsible for controlling the outcome of the survey.   Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Comparison testing shows that the MCAS can detect 
differences between MOSE components and units MCAS response.  Linear Regression 
is performed using the MRI Rate as the dependent variable and the mean MCAS response 
as the independent variable.  While the relationship between MCAS score and Incident 
Rate is slightly negative, it is indistinguishable from random variation. Component scores 
are fitted using demographics as the independent variables.   The results show that 
demographic factors account for minimal variance and therefore the MCAS appears to be 
demographically unbiased.   While these results are counter-intuitive, it may be that a 
units safety climate improves after it experiences a mishap. 
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 Naval Aviation is a hazardous endeavor that routinely puts lives and resources at 
risk, both on the ground and in the air.  Naval Aviations  goal is to continue to drive 
mishap rates toward zero while preserving, or even enhancing, our war fighting 
readiness (DON, 2000).   Much has been done to reduce the number of Class A Flight 
Mishaps (FMs) since the 1950s, but over the last decade, the FM rate has leveled off 
(Civarelli, Figlock, & Sengupta, 1997).  Human error remains a large contributor to FMs 
despite efforts to reduce this component.   In fact, in order to reach established error 
reduction goals, attention has now turned to include maintenance and maintainer error 
(Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997).   
  Roberts (1998) studied organizations that successfully manage hazardous 
operations while experiencing minimal losses, dubbing them High-Reliability 
Organizations (HROs).   Examples of HROs include nuclear submarines and aircraft 
carriers (Bierly & Spender, 1995; Roberts, 1990).  Consequently, Naval Aviation is 
viewed as a HRO that uses organizational culture to maintain high levels of safety and 
keep the number of mishaps low.   Strong evidence exists that an organizations safety 
culture impacts maintenance safety (Reason, 1997).  That is, the culture has a steady-state 
effect of being good rather that a short-term effect of getting good. 
 In 1996, when Naval Aviation first looked at organizational culture for possible 
causal factors, aircrew error was the primary focus since it had contributed to two-thirds 
of all Class A FMs since 1990 (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997).  The Command Safety 
Assessment (CSA) was developed to establish a link between safety culture and mishap 
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records.  The recent shift to maintenance safety led to the development of the 
Maintenance Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) to establish a link between a units 
safety culture and its mishap rate.  The MCAS has gone through numerous iterations and 
was most recently re-validated with the 3rd Marine Air Wing (Harris, 2000; Stanley, 
2000).  The prototype and modified MCAS was originally administered via paper and 
pencil and later on Scantron 8200 bubble sheets.  Now, the MCAS is available to all 
Navy and Marine Corps aviation units via the Internet (see Appendix A). As of 
November 2000, 40 different units had requested to take the on-line version of the 
MCAS. 
B. PURPOSE  
 The intent of this study is to:  1) determine if administration of the Internet-based 
MCAS yields results similar to those of the paper-and-pencil version (i.e. its validity and 
reliability in terms of whether or not any one MOSE area or individual question is 
determining the outcome of the MCAS); 2) determine whether MCAS results can predict 
which units are more likely to have MRIs; 3) ascertain whether MCAS results differ 
between units that experienced recent maintenance incidents and those that did not; and 
4) analyze demographic factors to determine if they have an effect on the MCAS 
responses. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 A prototype MCAS was developed to assess maintenance safety climate (Baker, 
1998).  Oneto (1999) studied the validity and reliability of MCAS by studying various 
Naval Air Reserve aircraft communities.  Goodrum (1999) conducted a similar study by 
analyzing the 14 squadrons of the Naval Air Reserve Fleet Logistics Wing.  Harris (2000) 
3 
and Stanley  (2000) administered the survey to the 3rd Maine Air Wing to examine its 
U.S. Marine Corps applicability and demographic effects.    This study examines the on-
line MCAS, its impact on survey results, the relationship with maintenance-related 
incident (MRI) data and squadron flight hours, and demographic variables.  Statistical 
methods will be used to address the following research questions: 
1. Does taking the MCAS on-line yield results similar to when it is administered 
via paper and pencil? 
 
2. Can the MCAS predict which units are more likely to have MRIs? 
 
3. Can the MCAS distinguish between aviation units that have and do not have 
MRIs? 
  
4. Do demographics impact survey responses and overall unit results? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 For this study, the on-line version of the MCAS is utilized to obtain maintainer 
perceptions of the command safety climate.  MCAS is also being evaluated to assess its 
effectiveness as a predictor of an aviation units safety record. Only Naval Aviation units 
which supplied a minimum of 20 MCAS respondents are included.   In order to protect 
the units identities, each unit is referred to by a letter (designation). 
 The survey is administered where the unit is currently located, with the only 
requirement being Internet access.  Participants include officer and enlisted maintainers. 
Specifically, only those personnel who are available when the unit chooses to take the 
survey participate.  Different aircraft communities and unit types vary in size; therefore 
there is variability in the number of participants per unit. 
 The Naval Aviation Safety Program (OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, 1989) governs the 
reporting and investigation of all Class A, B, and C incidents.  Using MRI reports 
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presents some difficulties since some of the MRI details are lost when the information is 
entered into the Safety Information Management System (SIMS) database.  Also, the 
governing instruction states that, unlike mishaps, HAZREPs are just recommended, not 
required, to be reported.  Consequently, the number of HAZREPs  is underreported in the 
SIMS database.  Lastly, commands have discretion in determining the recorded or 
reported cost associated with a mishap thereby potentially reducing a Class C MRI, 
which is required to be reported, to a HAZREP MRI, which may or may not be reported. 
 Chapter II reviews the literature on organizational culture, climate, high-reliability 
organizations, the history of MCAS, and the development of HFACS-ME.  Chapter III 
discusses the methodology used in this study.  Chapter IV presents the results and 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
      This chapter gives an in-depth literature review to provide an overview of the 
relationship between organizational climate, maintenance safety and the on-line MCAS. 
Text books, research papers, theses, and books on the subject are utilized. A discussion of 
organizational culture is followed by a description of HROs and the history of MCAS.  
The chapter concludes by summarizing the research and makes recommendations as to 
how to utilize the relationship between the Human Factors Quality Management Board 
(HFQMB) and the MCAS and to recommend a plan of action on how to prevent or 
minimize the number of mishaps in an aviation unit. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
 Organizational culture is a field of study that originated in the early 1980s as an 
offshoot of organizational behavior (Moorhead & Griffin, 1992).  Today, numerous 
books and papers have been written on the topic and researchers now routinely refer to it 
when tackling more traditional subjects regarding organizations (Moorhead & Griffin, 
1992).  The culture and climate of an organization affects each of its facets, from 
retention to safety (Reason, 1997).  Fortunately, an organizations culture can be 
changed, and it is up to the formal and informal leaders to assess the current culture and 
make changes as necessary.   
 There is no universally agreed-upon definition of organizational culture, and 
many prominent authors in the field create their own (Reason, 1997).  According to Deal 
and Kennedy (1982) organizational culture is the way we do things around here 
whereas Peters and Waterman (1982) contend it is a dominant and coherent set of shared 
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values conveyed by such symbolic means as stories, myths, legends, slogans, anecdotes, 
and fairy tales. However, there are three common themes found in every definition:  1) 
all authors agree that individuals in an organization have a set of common values; 2) 
these values are typically taken for granted by the leadership; and 3) most authors agree 
there is a symbolic way the values are communicated throughout the organization 
(Moorhead & Griffin, 1992). 
Daft (1998) cites numerous examples of how companies or organizations 
communicate their values.  The most common ways are rites and ceremonies, stories, 
symbols and language (Daft, 1998).  The leaders of an organization must remember that 
everything they say and do is being closely watched.  They are considered visual 
reminders of the organizations values.  If change is necessary, the leader must:  1) create 
the new vision and effectively communicate it to every member of the organization via 
speeches, company publications and personal actions; 2) get commitment for the changes 
from all levels; and finally 3) ensure the changes are made permanent by updating 
instructions and guidelines and ensuring that all current and new employees receive 
appropriate training (Daft, 1998).    
 An organizations culture allows its members to integrate internally and 
externally.  Internal integration is how members learn to work together.  External 
integration is how an organization as a whole successfully meets its mission and interacts 
with individuals outside of the organization or other institutions (Daft, 1998). 
[An organizations] culture is deep seated and difficult to change,  
but leaders can  influence or manage an organization's  culture. It  
is not easy, and it cannot be done rapidly, but leaders can have an  




 Organizational culture has recently been studied in connection with the role 
maintenance plays in safety in the workplace (Reason, 1997).  There is strong evidence 
that an organizations culture does have an impact on its maintenance safety (Reason, 
1997).  The reason that maintenance plays a major role in an organizations safety record 
is rather straightforward.  There are three forms of human activity that are occur in 
hazardous environments:  control under normal conditions, control under emergency 
conditions and maintenance-related activities (Reason, 1997).  Per Reason (1997), 
examples of maintenance-related activities include inspections, planned preventative 
maintenance, unscheduled work, testing and calibration.  Table 1 compares the levels of 
criticality and frequency of the three forms of activity and the extent to which each can be 
considered hands on.  Maintenance-related activities occur all the time and are typically 
hands on activities; therefore it is not surprising that maintenance-related activities are 
the ones that pose the greatest risk of human error. 
Activity Hands on Criticality Frequency 
Normal control Low Moderate High 
Emergency control Moderate High Low 
Maintenance-related High High High 
  
Table 1. Relative Likelihood of Performance Problems 
 in Universal Human Activities (From Reason, 1997) 
 
 Reason (1997) examines where human performance could be less then 
adequate, and he claims that regardless of the domain, all maintenance-related 
activities require the removal of all fastenings and the disassembly of components, 
followed by their reassembly and installation.  He asserts that most of the problems lie 
with this latter activity, the reassembly and installation.  To illustrate the point, he uses 
what he calls the bolt-and-nuts example (see Figure 1).    There is only one way to 
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remove all the bolts, so the chance of error while disassembling is small.  However, there 
are over 40,000 different ways for the nuts to be reinstalled in an incorrect order.  Despite 
the simplicity of the example, it is backed by data from the aircraft manufacturing 
industry.  In two studies of in-flight engine shut downs, approximately 70% of the 
contributing factors were various forms of installation errors (Reason, 1997). 
 The errors committed by maintenance personnel generally do not cause a mishap 
directly.  However, the latent conditions initiated by their maintenance-related errors can 
foster an environment that can ultimately lead to one (Reason, 1997).  One explanation 
for this is Reasons (1997) Swiss Cheese Model (See Figure 2), in which he likens an 
organization to slices of Swiss cheese with each representing a different layer of it.  The 
holes in a slice represent the weaknesses of that layer, which are constantly moving and 
changing shape.  When the slices are lined up, sometimes one layer will block the hole of 
another layer.  This example demonstrates how one layer of an organization can catch a 
mistake made by another.  However, there are times when the holes line up, and a failure 
is likely to occur.   The good news, Reason (1997) contends, is that despite the high 
frequency of maintenance-related errors, the conditions that cause them are fertile ground 
for major improvements in the human factors arena.   
Figure 1.  The Bolt-and-Nuts Example 
(From Reason, 1997)  
9 
 [HFAC-ME] facilitates the recognition of absent or defective defenses  
            at four  levels, including, Unsafe: Management Conditions  (Organiza-  
            tional  &  Supervisory),  Maintainer Conditions, Working Conditions,  
 and Maintainer Acts (OPNAVINST 3750.6R Appendix O, 2001). 
 
Figure 3 is a visual depiction of the four levels of absent or defective defenses of the 
HFAC-ME that are discussed above.  Figure 3 illustrates how any one or all could 


































M I S H A P
Management Conditions
 
Figure 3.  The HFACS - Maintenance Extension (HFACS-ME) 
(OPNAVINST 3750.6R, Appendix O, 2001) 
 
C. HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS 
 Engineering a flexible culture is part of the process of instilling a safety culture 
(Reason, 1997), and organizations with a flexible culture are capable of adapting to 
changing demands while still being safe.  As mentioned earlier, Roberts led the research 
in this area, calling organizations with this trait HROs  (Reason, 1997).    They carry out 
their demanding activities with a very low error rate and an almost complete absence of 
catastrophic failures and maintain the capacity for meeting periods of very high demand 
and production.    The research done by Roberts and others showed that most of HROs 
studied were either military organizations or had former military members in key 
positions.  The disciplined work style, a trust in Standard Operating Procedures, and 
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knowledge of how a rank-structure organization works all help to solidify the shared 
values of an organization and are characteristic of the military and HROs (Reason, 1997). 
D. HUMAN FACTORS QUALITY MANAGEMENT BOARD (HFQMB) 
 After a series of Class A FMs in late 1995 and early 1996, the Naval Postgraduate 
Schools (NPS) School of Aviation Safety became involved in a comprehensive effort to 
reduce mishaps caused by human factors.  The effort produced the HFQMB, a panel of 
experts that contained 
  a broad spectrum of expertise from  operational,  safety and  
 academic communities.  Members include representatives from  
 each  [aviation]  type commander  [Naval  Air Forces  Atlantic,  
 Pacific,  Reserve Force and  Aviation Training Command],  the 
 Naval  Safety  Center,  senior aviators  in operational command  
 and  junior  aviators  from  the  Navy  and  Marine  Corps, plus  
 aviation  safety  and  human factors  professionals  (Nutwell  &  
 Sherman, 1997).   
 
The HFQMB used a three-part approach:  1) in-depth research into the causes of mishaps 
and factors affecting human performance; 2) organizational benchmarking to learn from 
other aviation organizations; and 3) the Command Safety Assessment to identify human 
error, uncover best practices in the aviation industry and assess the safety climate of 
Naval Aviation units (Nutwell & Sherman, 1997).  The HFQMB concentrated on aircrew 
error initially since the latter was a contributor in almost 80% of the Class A FMs since 
1990 (Schmidt, Schmorrow & Hardee, 1998).  During the first 18 months of the HFQMB 
existence, the Navy FM rate dropped to its lowest point ever (Schmidt et al. 1998).   
Energized by these results and recognizing a concern for issues related to aging aircraft, 
the HFQMB decided to expand its focus to include maintenance operations and adapted a 
similar three-prong process (Schmidt et al. 1998). 
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 Organizational culture and related climate was looked at as a possible causal 
factor of FMs and HRO research was used to help identify key organizational issues in 
order to improve [Naval Aviations] understanding of the possible influence a Naval 
command may have in the event leading up to a FM (Ciaverelli, Figlock, & Sengupta, 
1999).    The NPS School of Aviation Safety adapted its findings for use in Naval 
Aviation, calling the resulting framework Model of Organizational Safety Effectiveness 
(MOSE) (Ciaverelli et al. 1999).  The five areas of the model are: 
• Process Auditing:  A system of ongoing checks to identify hazards and correct 
safety problems. 
 
• Reward System:  The expected social rewards and disciplinary action used to 
reinforce safe behavior, and correct unsafe behavior. 
 
• Quality Control:  The policies and procedures for promoting high quality work 
performance. 
 
• Risk Management:  A systematic process used to identify hazards and control 
operational risk. 
 
• Command and Control:  The organizations overall safety climate, leadership 
effectiveness, and the policies and procedures used in the management of flight 
operations and safety.   
 
E. MAINTENANCE CLIMATE ASSESSMENT SURVEY (MCAS) 
 Baker (1998), in his thesis, made adaptations to the MOSE and an aircrew-based 
survey to develop a prototype MCAS for Naval Aviation maintenance personnel.  His 
survey consisted of 15 demographic and 67 maintenance-related items organized 
according to the MOSE components.  After testing it with 268 participants from three 
reserve squadrons, he determined that the MOSE can be used to model a units 
maintenance environment.  However, a sixth category, Communication/Functional 
Relationship (CF), was added to accommodate items that did not fit into any of the 
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original five MOSE areas. Through factor analysis, he was then able to pare the survey 
down to 35 questions. 
 Goodrum (1999) and Oneto (1999) picked up where Bakers thesis left off. Oneto 
studied a variety of squadrons in the Naval Air Reserve, surveying 439 maintenance 
personnel from various aircraft communities: H-60, C-9 and C-130, and P-3.  Goodrum 
studied a Naval Air Reserve Fleet Logistics Support Wing and surveyed nearly 1000 
maintainers in three aircraft communities with similar aircraft types: C-9B, C-20, and C-
103T.  The combined results of the two studies determined that the MCAS is an useful 
tool for capturing an aviation maintainers perceptions of safety in maintenance 
operations (Harris, 2000).  Goodrum and Oneto proposed nearly identical 40-item 
surveys, and the current 43-item survey is a direct result of their work. 
 Harris (2000) and Stanley (2000) took the resulting 43-item survey and assisted in 
administering it to the 3rd Marine Air Wing.  A total of 977 individuals took the survey, 
and 681 were included in both studies (surveys from underrepresented units and an 
intermediate maintenance facility were excluded).  Harris once again established the 
validity and reliability of the survey, and extended it to cover USMC units.  However, 
Harris was not able to single out any one of the MOSE components as being a predictor 
of a squadrons results.  Stanley (2000) took the same survey responses and examined the 
relationship between demographics and MCAS.  He found that demographics had little 
utility in predicting the scores of a given unit.  
 In early July 2000, the MCAS became available on-line via the NPS School of 
Aviation Safety website.  It is a self-administered survey with nine demographic and 43 
maintenance-related items  (see Appendix A).  Once a squadron has completed the 
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survey, the commanding officer is able to get an instant snapshot of the results.  As of 20 
November 2000, 40 aviation commands had taken the survey. 
 Taking the survey on-line presents some slightly different challenges than when 
taking the paper-and-pencil version.  A participant is no longer able to choose to leave an 
item blank. The on-line MCAS requires a selection of one of the six responses,  including 
Dont Know and Not Applicable, before it will move on to the next question.  
However, the system does not prevent a participant from selecting the same response for 
every question.   It also requires a basic level of computer knowledge to find the 
appropriate web site and navigate through it.  
F. HUMAN FACTORS ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM     
    MAINTENANCE EXTENSION (HFACS-ME) 
 
 In an effort to more accurately categorize and analyze human errors that 
contribute to Naval Aviation mishaps, Naval Aerospace Experimental Psychologists 
(Wiegman & Shappell, 1997) of the Naval Safety Center created HFACS (Schmidt et al. 
1998).  Features of Birds Domino Theory, Edwards SHEL Model, and Reasons Swiss 
Cheese Model are included in HFACS (Schmidt et al. 1998).   
 Latent conditions and active failures are partitioned into one of three  
 top-level categories.  These categories enable an analyst to  identify  
 failures a t each  of the three levels historically related to  accidents:    
 supervisory condition,  operator  condition, and operator act.  These  
 classifications  are then   used  to  target   appropriate    intervention                                                      
 strategies  (Schmidt et al. 1998). 
 
 A maintenance-specific taxonomy, HFACS-ME was developed from HFACS to 
assist investigations of maintenance-related mishaps. It includes four broad categories of 
human error (see Figure 3): Management Conditions (a latent condition), Working 
Conditions (a latent condition), Maintainer Conditions (a latent condition), and 
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Maintainer Acts (an active condition).  The three latent conditions fall under the general 
area of organizational climate.  These are areas that can affect the performance of 
maintainers, play a role in active failures or unsafe acts by a maintainer and ultimately 
result in an incident (mishap, hazard, or injury).   It is possible for unsafe maintainer acts 
to turn into a latent maintenance error that aircrew may come across when in the cockpit.  
Also, latent supervisory errors can result in maintenance-related errors. Table 2, the 
HFACS-ME Category table, shows how the taxonomy is used.  It decomposes the four 
main first-order categories into second- and third-order subcategories.  The second-order 
categories decompose the first-order categories into two to three smaller areas.  The third-
order subcategories break down the second-order subcategories further to more specific 
areas by giving fairly specific examples of what types of errors are considered to be of 
that particular type (Schmidt et al. 1998).   
 In an effort to assist Naval Aviation to address maintenance-related safety issues, 
Schmorrow (1998) studied Naval Aviator maintenance mishaps using HFACS-ME.  He 
followed a study done by Schmidt et al. (1998), and created a way to conclude 
quantitatively whether significant patterns of human error in flight mishaps exist.   In a 
related effort, Teeters (1999) used MRMs, HAZREPS and Personal Injury Reports 
(PIPs).  He concluded that the number of incidents with these types of causal factors 
should decrease if the number of causal factors can be reduced.  Fry (2000), in his thesis, 
concluded that the HFACS-ME taxonomy gives sufficient guidelines for classifying 




Table 2.  The HFACS  Maintenance Extension Categories 
(From OPNAVINST 3750.6R, Appendix O, 2001) 
 
 
First-order Second-order Third-order 
Inadequate Processes 
Inadequate Documentation 









Adverse Mental State 
Adverse Physical State Medical 
Unsafe Limitation 
Inadequate Communication 







Personnel Readiness Infringement 
Inadequate Lighting/Light 
Unsafe Weather/Exposure Environment 





















 HRO research indicates that they are dynamic, complex organizations that are not 
immune to unsafe trends.   Perrow (1984) states that normal accidents will happen 
regardless of an organizations size, structure and nature.  With HROs, the accidents tend 
to happen less often, but tend to be larger when they do.  By using reactive measures such 
as mishap analysis and proactive measures to identify pathogenic conditions (Reason, 
1997), HROs can work towards eliminating accidents. 
 Downsizing and budget reductions in recent years have challenged Naval 
Aviation to find ways to keep operational readiness at an acceptable level (Schmorrow, 
1998).   Naval Aviation continues to search for ways to reduce the number of accidents 
and mishaps.  This effort will not only save the lives of aircrew and maintainers, but will 
also keep training, aircraft and maintenance expenses to a minimum.  Reducing 
maintenance-related human error is just one area where safety can be enhanced. 
 By utilizing HRO research, Naval Aviation takes advantage of the fact that the 
MOSE parallels Reasons informed culture.  Thus, tools such as MCAS and HFACS-ME 
can be used to reduce maintenance-related human error.  Work done by the NPS School 
of Aviation Safety has shown that when MCAS and HFACS-ME are properly utilized, 
they are effective in assessing an aviation units safety climate and classifying the errors 
that are present in mishaps, taking the first two steps in risk management: 1) identify the 










































A. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 This study involves the analysis of data received from the 43-item MCAS, taken 
by maintenance personnel from 27 Navy and Marine Corps aviation units.  The MCAS 
results are analyzed to make a determination if administration of the Internet-based 
MCAS yields results similar to those of the paper-and-pencil version and to ascertain if 
there is a difference between the validity and reliability established for a paper-and-pencil 
version and for the on-line one.  In this case, the validity and reliability refers to whether 
or not any MOSE area or individual question is dominating the outcome of the survey.  
Additionally, the results are partitioned by demographics to determine if demographics 
have an effect on the responses.  A comparison of the group mean and an individual unit 
mean is performed if statistical differences arise.  This comparison demonstrates how 
specific demographic groups differ from the unit as a whole. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
 1. Subjects 
The participants are Navy and Marine Corps officers and enlisted personnel 
involved in aviation maintenance from 30 units that completed the MCAS on-line.  The 
units comprise active-duty and reserve units from three different communities:  
Helicopters (Helo), Fixed Wing  Tactical Air (TACAIR), and Fixed Wing  Non-
Tactical Air (Non-TACAIR) (see Table 3).  Shore maintenance facilities are not 
included in this study.  Since 20 responses was the minimum number MCAS responses 
identified by the NPS School of Aviation Safety for an adequate unit sample, no unit 
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with fewer than 20 responses was included.  This inclusion criterion resulted in 27 of 30 
units being included in this study.         





USN 5 6 4 
USNR 1 1 5 
USMC 3 2 0 
USMCR 0 0 0 
                          
Table 3.  Units with at least 20 responses that took the on-line  
MCAS through 20 November 2000 by service and aircraft type. 
 
Summarized data on mishap and hazard reports for the 27 units included in the 
sample were obtained from the Navy Safety Center.  Only MRIs that occurred between 
January 1999 and December 2000 were included in this study. 
2.  Instrument 
The MCAS is a self-administered survey consisting of nine demographic and 43 
maintenance-related items  (see Appendix A).   The demographic  items are:  1)  rank;  
2) total years aviation maintenance experience; 3) work center; 4) primary shift; 5) 
current model aircraft; 6) status (active duty, drilling reservist or active reservist); 7) 
parent command; and 8) units location.  The maintenance items are grouped into the six  
HRO components:  process auditing, reward system, quality, risk management, 
command and control, and communication/functional relationships.  The MCAS utilizes 
a five-point Likert scale to capture participant responses:  Strongly Disagree, Disagree, 
Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree (note: options of Not Applicable and Dont Know 




 3. Procedure 
   a. Survey Administration  
  The MCAS is available to all Navy and Marine Corps aviation units via 
the Internet.  When a unit wants to take the survey, its safety officer contacts the NPS 
School of Aviation Safety.  Each unit is given a set of identification numbers equal in 
size to the number of personnel expected to take the survey.  It is up to the squadron to 
brief those personnel selected to take the survey on the purpose and importance of the 
survey.  Once at least twenty of the identification numbers actually distributed have been 
used, a squadron is considered complete and the commanding officer can see the results 
for his or her squadron. 
  b. Incident Data Acquisition   
                       The Naval Safety Center database was queried for all squadrons that 
completed the MCAS for incidents between January 1999 and December 2000. Eleven 
FMs and 44 HAZREPs were found.  Eight of the 27 squadrons had at least one FM 
during the period of interest.   The incident rate for each unit is then calculated.  To do 
this, the number of MRIs and HAZREPS for each unit is totaled and then divided by the 
total flight hours for the past two years.  This number is than standardized to give an 
incident rate per 100,000 flight hours, which is the standard used within Naval Aviation.  
C. DATA ANALYSIS 
 1. Data Tabulation  
            Survey responses are available via the website administrator, the NPS School of 
Aviation Safety. The responses consist of a spreadsheet containing one row per 
respondent and 57 columns.  The first two columns have a running count of the total 
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number of respondents and the date the survey was taken.  Columns three through ten 
represent the seven demographic variables plus two identification codes used by the 
website administrator.  The remaining columns correspond to questions one through 43 
of the survey.    The 43 items are grouped so as to correspond with the six MOSE 
components:  1) Process Auditing  (questions 1-6), 2) Reward System and Safety Culture 
(questions 7-14), 3) Quality Assurance (questions 15-20), 4) Risk Management 
(questions 21-29), 5) Command and Control (questions 30-37) and 6) 
Communication/Functional Relationships (questions 38-43).  The responses are scored as 
1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 per the Likert scale corresponding with the following statements: Strongly 
Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree and Strongly Agree, with additional options of Not 
Applicable and Dont Know available.  The mishap rate for each squadron is computed 
by dividing the number of mishaps for each squadron that occurred in the January 1999 
to December 2000 period by the units total number of flight hours for the same period. 
    2. Statistical Analysis 
          Summary statistics are computed for each squadron and individual participants.  
Means are computed for each MOSE area for each squadron and respondent.   Principal 
components analysis is used to determine if any MOSE component or item is dominating 
the outcome of the survey.   ANOVA and MANOVA are conducted to see if the MCAS 
can detect differences between the MOSE components and the units.  Simple linear 
regression is performed using the units mean MCAS as the independent variable and 
their incident rate as the dependent variable to determine if a units mean MCAS score 
can be used to determine a unit is more or less likely to have experienced an incident.  
Regression is also performed using unit and individual respondents demographics as the 
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independent variables and the MOSE area means, the overall mean, and incident rate as 

















































A. MCAS DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 1. Sample  
MCAS survey information is collected from the MCAS site-administrator at the 
NPS School of Aviation.  Survey responses from 2,180 individuals were collected.  Of 
these, 365 were from an Aviation Intermediate Maintenance Activity and were not 
included in this study since that unit provides intermediate maintenance and does not 
have any aircrew or aircraft assigned.  Additionally, 49 surveys are removed because the 
same response to each item was recorded, 24 surveys from three units are not included 
because each unit had fewer than the required minimum 20 participants, and nine surveys 
with Other selected as Service were removed because it was found they had undue 
influence.  The remaining 1,731 surveys are addressed in the MCAS Results section. 
MCAS offers 36 different options for aircraft type.  To ease the analysis, the 36 types are 
divided into three groups: Helo, Fixed Wing-TACAIR, and Fixed Wing-Non-TACAIR.  
For this study, the following aircraft types are represented:  Helo:  H-53 and H-60; Fixed 
Wing-TACAIR: EA-6, F-14, FA-18, and AV-8; Fixed Wing-NON-TACAIR:  P-3, E-6, 
C-130, and C-9.   
 2. Analysis of Removed Surveys 
 An effort was made to determine if removing the surveys with the same response 
biases the Principal Component Analysis.  Table 4 lists the frequency and percentages of 
the surveys removed by ranks.  Table 5 shows the response chosen by those who chose 
the same response for all items. Response four, Agree, was selected most often. 
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Rank Total # Surveyed # Removed % Removed 
E1-E3 444 17 3.83% 
E4-E5 819 24 2.93% 
E6-E9 496   7 1.41% 
WO1-O6   56 1 1.79% 
Total            1815 49 2.70% 
 
Table 4.  Percentage and Count of Removed Surveys by 
Participant Rank Response 
  
Response  Response # # of Participants 
Not Applicable  0  0 
Strongly Disagree  1  2 
Disagree  2  0 
Neutral  3              12 
Agree  4              25 
Strongly Agree  5  6 
Don't Know 6  4 
 
Table 5.  Number of All-Identical Responses by Response Chosen 
 
 Figure 4 compares the surveys removed to those retained for this study by 
respondent rank.  It shows that the percent of removed surveys is similar to the percent of 
retained.  Comparing these results to Harris (2000) shows that he removed 61 of 977 
original surveys or 6.24%, while for this study 49 of 2,180 original surveys, or just 
2.24%, were removed.  
 Table 6 shows the frequency of surveys removed by unit.  The range of removed 
surveys varies from just over one percent for unit L to over 16 percent for unit M.  
Investigation of unit M reveals 11 of 66 surveys were removed.  It is noted that seven of 
the 11 removed surveys for unit M were in the E4  E5 rank group and Power Plants 
workcenter leading one to hypothesize that those individuals consulted with one another 
regarding the MCAS prior to taking it.   Having the survey available via the Internet 
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eliminates the option of a participant leaving an item unanswered but it is still possible 










Figure 4.  Comparison of Retained and Removed Surveys by Rank 
 
 
A B C E F G H J  
3.4 3.2 2.1 3.2 6.1 4.2 3.3 4.4  
         
L M N O P U V Y Mean 
1.1 16.6 3.1 2.1 11.5 7.4 2.7 1.2 4.7 
 
Table 6.  Frequency (%) by Unit of Surveys Removed 
 
3. Demographics 
The number of survey participants by rank and unit is provided in Table 7.  To 
protect the identity of participating units, letters are used in place of the actual unit name.  
Approximately 67.3 percent of the respondents are enlisted aviation maintainers in the 
ranks of E1  E5.  This percentage is lower than the 84.9 percent reported by Harris 
(2000) in his study of the 3rd Marine Air Wing, the 79.2 percent by Goodrum (1999) in 
his study of the Fleet Logistics Support Wing and the 81 percent by Oneto (1999) in his 
study of several aircraft communities within the Naval Air Reserve.  However, this study 
takes in to consideration a much larger number of surveys.  All of the units have a similar 
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proportion of E1-E5s, except for those units with a small number of responses (see 
Figure 5).  
4. MCAS MOSE Component Statistics 
Table 8 shows the mean response by each of the MOSE categories and unit. The 
corresponding survey items for each MOSE category are listed in Chapter III, Section 
C.1 The means for the 43 survey items for each unit can be found in Appendix B. 
B. MCAS PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS  
 To test whether or not the six MOSE components account equally for the majority 
of the variability in the data, principal component analysis (Hamilton, 1992) is used.  A 
1761 by 43 matrix of individual survey responses, each row representing one survey 
response and each column representing one survey item, is used to create a 27 by 43 
matrix, with one row for each of the 27 units.  Since responses of 0 for N/A and 6 for 
Dont Know were not available when Harris (2000) and Stanley (2000) administered 
the survey and because those responses would artificially lower or raise the menas, they 
are disregarded in computing the individual item and MOSE category means.  Since all 
items are on the same scale, the covariance matrix is used.   A common usage of principal 
component analysis is determining which survey items are the most important or 
conversely, which ones can be removed.  For this study, it is being used to determine 






Unit E1-E3 E4-E5 E6-E9 WO1-O6 TOTAL 
  # % # % # % # % # % 
A 16 27.5 25 27.6 10 17.2 5 8.6 58 3.2
B 37 38.9 40 42.1 14 14.7 1 1.1 95 5.3
C 22 4.3 17 36.2 7 14.9 0 0.0 47 2.6
D 0 0.0 19 63.3 11 36.7 0 0.0 30 1.7
E 9 14.5 27 43.5 21 33.8 3 4.8 62 3.4
F 9 18.4 18 36.7 15 30.6 4 8.2 49 2.7
G 16 16.7 33 34.4 41 42.7 2 2.1 96 5.3
H 26 28.3 40 43.5 21 22.8 2 2.2 92 5.1
I 6 20.7 13 44.8 10 34.5 0 0.0 29 1.6
J 15 22.1 31 45.6 16 23.5 3 4.4 68 3.7
K 5 23.8 7 33.3 7 33.3 2 9.5 21 1.2
L 21 23.3 46 51.1 19 21.1 3 3.3 90 5
M 5 7.6 35 53.0 14 21.2 1 1.5 66 3.6
N 30 31.3 42 43.7 15 15.6 6 6.3 96 5.3
O 101 43.2 71 30.3 49 20.9 8 3.4 234 12.9
P 4 15.4 10 38.5 8 30.7 1 3.8 26 1.4
Q 43 40.6 43 40.6 18 16.9 2 1.9 106 5.8
R 19 41.3 17 36.9 10 21.7 0 0.0 46 2.5
S 1 2.4 18 43.9 20 48.8 2 4.9 41 2.2
T 7 11.8 32 54.2 19 32.2 1 1.7 59 3.3
U 0 0.0 13 48.1 11 40.7 1 3.7 27 1.5
V 1 1.4 39 52.7 32 43.2 0 0.0 74 4.1
W 20 18.7 56 52.3 29 27.1 2 1.8 107 5.9
X 0 0.0 1 17.0 5 83.0 0 0.0 6 0.3
Y 8 9.5 41 48.8 32 38.1 2 2.4 84 4.6
Z 0 0.0 16 51.6 14 45.2 1 3.2 31 1.7
AA 2 8.3 12 50.0 10 4.7 0 0.0 24 1.3
BB 4 12.1 19 57.6 8 24.2 2 6.1 33 1.8
CC 0 0.0 14 82.0 3 18.0 0 0.0 17 0.9
DD 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 0.1
Total 427 23.5 795 43.9 489 26.9 55 3.0 1815 100
 























Figure 5.  Percentage of MCAS Respondents with Rank E1  E5 for Each Unit 
 Figure 6 is a scree-plot that plots the variance contributed by each component for 
the six MOSE areas.  It is apparent by examining figure 6 that the first component 
accounts for 90.6 percent of the variance of the data.  Reviewing the loading plot (see 
Appendix C) for the loadings of the individual MOSE areas shows that the variance for 
the first component is shared fairly equally among all six of the MOSE areas.   It should 
be noted that the principal component loadings are the coefficients of the principal 
components transformations.   Also displayed in Appendix C are the loading plots for 
each of the 43 survey items grouped into the six individual MOSE areas.  These results 
show that all of the items load approximately equally, from .151 for item 23 to .498 for 
item 15, across the first component with the exception of item 21 whose loading is -.201 
and item 38 whose loading is .702.  Item 21 was also noted in Harris (2000) study as 
having a negative loading.  Examination of item 21 reveals it is the one survey item that 
is worded negatively.  It states: Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely 
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affect maintenance (see Appendix A).  Examination of item 38, which states Good 
communication exists up and down the chain of command, reveals it has the most 
variation of the six questions in the CF MOSE area and had no responses of  Strongly 
Agree. 
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Unit PA RS QA RM CC CF Mean 
A 4.40 4.10 4.40 3.85 4.21 4.15 4.15 
B 4.15 3.76 4.08 3.62 3.83 3.79 3.85 
C 3.93 3.75 3.83 3.67 3.73 3.73 3.77 
D 3.63 3.18 3.45 3.04 3.21 3.17 3.28 
E 4.10 3.67 3.91 3.28 3.70 3.67 3.69 
F 3.85 3.53 3.55 3.26 3.66 3.66 3.59 
G 3.99 3.81 3.85 3.39 3.83 3.76 3.75 
H 3.82 3.47 3.64 3.10 3.50 3.37 3.45 
I 4.11 3.81 3.97 3.26 3.76 3.79 3.74 
J 3.84 3.52 3.84 3.37 3.62 3.46 3.59 
K 3.86 3.62 3.89 3.51 3.65 3.53 3.65 
L 3.75 3.34 3.54 3.16 3.40 3.39 3.41 
M 3.64 3.38 3.69 3.07 3.46 3.45 3.43 
N 3.96 3.73 3.91 3.40 3.77 3.66 3.72 
O 4.05 3.77 3.85 3.46 3.75 3.64 3.73 
P 3.55 3.35 3.51 2.94 3.18 3.17 3.27 
Q 3.74 3.21 3.40 3.06 3.31 3.19 3.30 
R 4.03 3.70 3.75 3.35 3.71 3.56 3.66 
S 3.99 3.92 3.91 3.46 3.93 3.90 3.84 
T 3.98 3.52 3.64 3.17 3.54 3.36 3.51 
U 3.67 3.37 3.46 2.97 3.19 3.47 3.32 
V 3.98 3.71 4.02 3.48 3.79 3.70 3.76 
W 3.80 3.58 3.67 3.47 3.74 3.54 3.62 
Y 3.94 3.77 3.96 3.43 3.76 3.73 3.74 
Z 3.99 3.64 3.98 3.33 3.71 3.63 3.65 
AA 4.05 3.80 4.06 3.62 3.79 3.70 3.81 
BB 4.11 4.03 4.19 3.77 4.08 3.94 4.01 
CC 3.95 3.77 4.07 3.57 3.57 3.53 3.74 
DD 3.67 2.63 3.67 2.33 2.88 3.67 3.14 
Mean for all Units 3.92 3.63 3.81 3.35 3.66 3.60 3.64 
Mean for Units w/
>= 20 Participants 3.91 3.60 3.82 3.32 3.63 3.60 3.63 
 
Table 8.  Mean MCAS Response for all Units and for Units with at least 20 




C. MCAS MOSE COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
 Only the 27 units with a minimum of 20 responses are used to conduct additional 
analysis, ANOVA and MANOVA on the MOSE components.   Figures 8 and 9 are box 
plots displaying the MOSE scores for the six components and the MCAS scores for each 
of the 27 units, respectively.  The mean Likert scale response (1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 
= Disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly Agree) for the MOSE 
components and the units is 3.64.  Responses of 0 = N/A and 6 = Dont Know were 
not included.  Of note, the mean for Risk Management (RM) is 3.35 with a low of 2.94 
for unit P and a high of  3.85 for unit  A.  The highest-scored   component is Process 
Auditing (PA) with a mean of 3.92, ranging from 3.55 for unit P to 4.40 for unit A.  Unit 
P had the lowest mean score for both RM and PA, while unit A had the highest means for 
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Figure 8.  Boxplots of Units MCAS Means  
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 Table 9 compares Harris (2000) results with this study.  When comparing the 
current study and Harris, the MOSE mean and range for the MOSE means are similar 
with the same MOSE components recording the lowest and highest means.  For the units, 
the mean and the range are also comparable, although the highest unit mean for this study 
with 27 units is more than 0.5 above the overall mean compared to just 0.3 higher in 









Table 9.  Comparison between Harris (2000) study and this study 
 
1. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
            To see if either the squadron or MOSE component displays any effect on the 
mean survey response, a two-way ANOVA is conducted.  A data set of the 27 units (the 
first factor) and the six MOSE components (the second factor) is used.  This means there 
are 162 possible cross-classifications.  The mean item response from Table 8 is the 
dependent variable.    The ANOVA is weighted by the number of participants per unit 
(see Table 7).  The ANOVA model is: MCAS mean is modeled by Unit and the MOSE 
Components.  The mean for each cross-classification consists of a grand mean, a squared 
 Harris (2000) Hernandez (2001) 
# Units 9 27 
MOSE Low Category RM RM 
MOSE Low Mean 3.24  3.35  
MOSE High Category PA  PA 
MOSE High Mean 3.86 3.92 
MOSE Mean 3.51 3.64 
Unit Low 3.22 3.27 
Unit High 3.84 4.15 
Unit Mean 3.51 3.64 
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effect, a MOSE Component effect, and an error term, where the error terms are 
independent, and normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance. 
          Table 10 displays the  results of ANOVA  analysis.  As can  be seen, the  resulting  
p-values for the null hypotheses that there is no unit effect and no component effect are 
<.0001.  Therefore, there is evidence that at least one unit has a population mean different 
from the grand mean and that at least one of the MOSE components has a population 
mean different from the grand mean.  These results are also similar to those of Harris 








Table 10.  ANOVA of Unit and MOSE Factors 
 
2. Multiple ANOVA Comparisons 
A multiple comparison analysis of the MOSE components factors is conducted 
using Tukeys procedure.  This test determines which MOSE components are 
significantly different from one another.  Using the Studentized Range probability 
distribution, simultaneous confidence intervals for all pairwise comparisons were 
computed.  Appendix D contains the appropriate S-PLUS code and output for Tukeys 
procedure for the MOSE components and the individual units.  The resulting confidence 
intervals are the intervals for the differences between true treatment means for each pair.  
Intervals that do not contain zero mean that the treatment means are statistically different 
(Devore, 1995).  Figure 9 displays the results.  The MOSE component means are 
arranged in increasing order.  Underscores show pairs for which the confidence interval 
 df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F p-value 
Unit   26 405.37 15.59   42.76 <.0001 
Comp    5 343.62 68.72 188.47 <.0001 
Residuals 130      47.40   0.36   
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contains zero and whose members are therefore not statistically different 
(distinguishable) from each other.  As can be seen, RM, QA, and PA are different from 
all other components. 
RM    CF    RS    CC    QA    PA 
                                                                   ________________________ 
                              3.35        3.60     3.63     3.66       3.87      3.92 
Figure 9.  Identifying Statistically Different MOSE Components 
 A similar multiple comparison analysis is conducted of the units.  See Figure 8. 
The results of the pairwise comparison are complex since there are numerous 
comparisons of the 27 units.  However, it can be stated that some units have mean scores 
which differ significantly under the model.     
D. INCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS 
 From January 1999 to December 2000, the 27 units included in this study 
experienced two class A and eight class C mishaps and 39 HAZREPS.  There were no 
class B mishaps during this timeframe.  These MRIs and HAZREPs were attributed to 18 
of the 27 units.  Table 11 displays the total MRIs with the associated costs.  During this 
timeframe, units B, D, E, I, K, M, O, Q, and S reported no MRIs.  Units C and T each had 
two class C mishaps.  
 To determine if there is a relationship between a units mean MCAS score and 
their MRIs and HAZREPS, linear regression is performed.  First, each units incident rate 
per flight hour is calculated.  To do this, the number of MRIs and HAZREPS for the past 
two years in each unit is computed and then divided by the total flight hours in that 
period.  This number is than standardized to give an incident rate per 100,000 flight 
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hours, which is the standard used within Naval Aviation.  Table 12 displays these results 












Table 11. Total MRIs and Associated Costs ($K) between Jan 99  Dec 00 
 Simple linear regression is performed with mean MCAS as the independent (or 
predictor) variable and incident rate as the dependent (or response) variable.  Figure 10 
show a plot of the resulting linear regression.  It is apparent that unit F has high influence, 
thus affecting the slope coefficient.    Figure 11 plots the same regression without unit F.  
Appendix E has the specifics of both regressions.  For the model with unit F included, the 
estimated slope coefficient is 61.37 with an associated t-value of .7203.  For the model 
without F, the estimated slope coefficient is 21.42 and associated t-value of .7378.   The 
relationship between MCAS score and Incident Rate, although slightly negative, is 
indistinguishable from random variation. 
Unit Class A ($K) Class C ($K) HAZREPs ($K) 
A 0 0 1 
C 0 224.6 (2) 0 
F 17,828.0 0 3 
G 17,099.0 0 3 
H 0 0 3 
J 0       179.4 0 
L 0 0 1 
N 0 0 4 
P 0         31.9 2 
R 0         35.1 1 
T 0  126.3 (2) 7 
U 0 0 3 
V 0 0 1 
W 0 0 3 
Y 0 0 1 
Z 0          79.2 1 
AA 0 0 1 


















                  
 
 
Table 12.  Unit Incidents, Flight Hours, Incident Rate and 







Unit # Incidents Flight Hours (FH) Incident/FH Mean MCAS 
F 4    414 966.28 3.59 
T 9 2,986       301.40 3.51 
R 2    949       210.70 3.66 
U 3 2,982 100.60 3.32 
      BB 4 4,513   88.63 4.01 
W 3 3,443   87.13 3.62 
G 4 5,446   73.44 3.75 
N 4 6,083   65.75 3.72 
P 3 4,871   61.58 3.27 
J 1 1,976  50.60 3.59 
Z 2 4,183 47.80 3.65 
C 2 4,584 43.63 3.77 
H 3 7,613 39.31 3.45 
A 1 2,615 38.24 4.15 
Y 1 3,893 25.68 3.74 
V 1 4,601 21.73 3.76 
L 1 5,299 18.87 3.41 
      AA 1           12,542   7.97 3.81 
B 0 4,318   0.00 3.85 
D 0 1,694   0.00 3.28 
E 0 4,413   0.00 3.69 
I 0 5,621   0.00 3.74 
K 0 2,992   0.00 3.65 
M 0 4,889   0.00 3.43 
O 0 5,259   0.00 3.73 
Q 0 4,905   0.00 3.30 
S 0 1,171   0.00 3.84 
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3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0
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Figure 10.  Linear Regression: MCAS Mean vs. Incident Rate, for all 27 Units  
3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0






















































Figure 11. Linear Regression:  MCAS Mean vs. Incident Rate, without unit F 
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E. DEMOGRAPHICS ANALYSIS   
  Linear models for the six individual MOSE components are fit against the 
demographic factors of rank, model aircraft, workcenter, status, shift and total years 
maintenance experience using the linear model function of S-PLUS.     The models are 
then reduced via the stepAIC () function, which does stepwise variable selection to 
minimize the Akaike Information Criterion (Venables & Ripley, 1999).  Initial models 
indicated that some of the categories for rank and workcenter had undue leverage.  After 
conferring with subject matter experts at the Naval Safety Center and NPS School of 
Aviation Safety, some of the categories for rank and workcenter were combined.  The 
models were than fit again (see Appendix F for details).  In all cases, the values of the 
multiple R-squared, or coefficient of determination, show that the models account for 
very little of the variance.  The best model is the one for RM, accounting for 11.7 percent 
of the variance.  The worst model is that for PA, which explains only 5.1 percent of the 
variance.  In addition, the values for the residual standard error indicate that there is a 
large spread in the response values, considering that the range of possible responses is 
only from one to five.   When the stepAIC () function is applied to the models in an 
attempt to reduce them, little change occurs (see Table 13).   These results are similar to 
those of Stanley (2000).    From the results, the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients 







Component R-Squared (%) Residual Standard Error 
PA 0.049 0.609 
RS 0.088 0.649 
QA 0.093 0.672 
RM 0.117 0.591 
CC 0.090 0.631 
CF 0.091 0.659 
 



















V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
 Organizational leaders, specifically Naval Aviation unit commanders in this case, 
are ultimately responsible for the safety of their personnel and material resources while 
simultaneously minimizing risk when accomplishing their given missions. Since 1950, 
the number of Class A Flight Mishaps (FMs) has decreased, but over the last decade, the 
FM rate has leveled off (Civarelli, Figlock, & Sengupta, 1997).  Human error remains a 
large contributor to FMs despite efforts to reduce this component.   In fact, in order to 
reach established error reduction goals, attention has now turned to include maintenance 
and maintainer error (Schmidt, Schmorrow, & Hardee, 1997).   
 The main objective of this study was to determine if administration of the 
Internet-based MCAS yields results similar to the paper-and-pencil version (i.e. its 
validity and reliability in terms of whether or not any MOSE area or individual question 
is determining the outcome of the MCAS).  Of secondary interest was whether MCAS 
results differ between units that had experienced recent maintenance-related incidents and 
those that had not.  The final item of interest was whether demographic factors have an 
effect on MCAS responses.   This research involved 2,180 survey responses from the first 
four months of the MCAS being available via the Internet and the analysis of 49 MRIs 
from between January 1999 and December 2000. 
 B. CONCLUSIONS 
 This study shows that the MCAS administered via the Internet is just as effective 
as the paper-and-pencil version at capturing a maintainers perception of maintenance 
safety.  Principal component analysis did not identify any one MOSE component or 
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question that was responsible for controlling the outcome of the survey.  Some surveys 
were removed because the same response was selected for each of the 43 survey items.  
However, since the overall percentage of removed surveys was small, just 2.24%, and the 
distribution of ranks associated with those surveys was similar to the overall distribution 
of ranks, it is determined they do not effect the outcome.  The Internet-based MCAS does 
not allow an individual to skip a survey item.  A response has to be selected before the 
program will go to the next item.  However, the program does not prevent the same 
response being selected for every item.  One minor finding was with regard to item 21.  It 
was found to load negatively in the first principal component due to the negative wording 
of the question. 
 ANOVA and multiple comparison testing determined that the MCAS is able to 
detect differences between the MOSE components and the units MCAS response.  The 
analysis showed RM has the lowest mean among the six MOSE components and PA the 
highest.   This is consistent with the study done by Harris (2000). 
 Analysis of the MRIs of the 27 units detected a slight negative relationship 
between a units mean MCAS and its incident rate.   However, with just 27 units and nine 
of them having zero MRIs, the relationship is indistinguishable from random variation.   
It may be that a units safety awareness typically increases immediately following any 
mishap it experiences.  It is also important to remember that the safety climate of a unit 
with regard to its commander lasts at most two years and changes even more frequently 
at lower levels of the unit.  Each of these changes will affect how at least a portion of the 
unit perceives the safety climate of the unit.   Because the range of mean MCAS score for 
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units with no MRIs and those with at least one overlap, it is not possible to provide a 
profile of a unit more likely to have a MRI from this data. 
 Linear models are fit using the six MOSE areas as the dependent variable and the 
individual demographic factors as the independent variables.  In every case, the resulting 
model show the demographic factors account for very little of the variance.  Since there is 
no right answer for any of the survey items and they are all subjective perceptions, the 
human element accounts for a majority of the variance.  However, since the variance 
cannot be adequately explained by the demographic factors, there is no evidence of a 
demographic effect when the MCAS is administered via the Internet.      
 All of the above findings suggest that the on-line MCAS yields results similar to 
those of the paper-and-pencil version.  The biggest difference was that fewer surveys are 
removed since it is not possible to leave an item blank.  To further reduce the number of 
surveys that have to be removed, a modification to the software could be made to 
disallow the same response to all items.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Based on the conclusions from this study, a number of recommendations are 
listed below: 
1. Risk Management maintenance processes should be reviewed by all Naval 
Aviation units since this area consistently is ranked the lowest of the six 
MOSE areas.  
 
2. Minor modifications of the MCAS should be considered, including, positively 
wording item 21 so that it is in line with the other 42 items, randomizing the 
survey items with respect to the MOSE components to eliminate the 
possibility of response order effects, and modifying the software so that a 





3. In order to accurately determine if a relationship between perceptions of 
maintenance safety and actual safety records exist, require, that at a minimum, 
all Naval Aviation units take the MCAS during the same 30-day period and 
repeat this for three to four years.  This would give a starting point or base 
line for each unit for year-to-year comparisons of their mean MCAS scores 
and incident rates. 
 
 
Implementation of these recommendations will yield a more useful and effective MCAS 
for use by all Naval Aviation units.   
 One area for further research regarding the MCAS and maintenance safety 
throughout the Navy as a whole is investigating the feasibility of adapting the MCAS to 
afloat and ashore units.  As recent current events have shown, on the USS COLE and 
USS GREENVILLE, for example, organizational mishaps/accidents in the Navy happen 
to all types of units, not just aviation units.  Application of organizational climate 
research and maintenance safety could ultimately make all Navy and Marine Corps units 
more aware of how organizational climate effects safety and reduce future incidents and 




APPENDIX A.  MCAS ITEMS 
 
As of the date of this thesis, the website for the MCAS is:  
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~avsafety/safesurv.htm.   
 
PART 1.  DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
1.  Rank:  E1 - E3, E4 - E5, E6 - E7, E8 - E9, WO 1 - 4, O1 - O3, O4  O6 
2.  Total Years Aviation Experience:  <1, 1 - 2, 3  5, 6  10, 11  15,  16  20, 20+ 
3.  Work Center:  Airframes, Avionics, Flight Line, Maintenance Control,   
     Ordnance, Power Plants, QA, Survival, Other 
4.  Primary Shift:  Day, Night  
5.  Current Model Aircraft:  AH1, AV-8, C-2, C-9, C-12, C-20, C-26, C-35, C-37, 
     C-40, C-130, E-2. E-6, EA-6, F-5, F-14, FA-18, H-1, H-2, H-3, H-46, H-53,  
     H-60, P-3, PIONEER, S-3, T-1, T-2, T-6, T-34, T-37, T-44, T-45, TA-4, TH-57, V-22   
6.  Status:  Regular, Active Reserve, Drilling Reserve 
7.  Service:  USN, USMC, Other   
8.  Parent Command:  CNAL, CNAP, CNARF, CNATRA, NAVAIR, CNO,  
     1 MAW, 2 MAW, 3 MAW, 4 MAW, CMC, COMCAB EAST, COMCAB                       
     WEST, Other 
9.  Units Location:  Ashore, Afloat, Overseas, FRS 
 
PART 2. SURVEY ITEMS 
 
A.  PROCESS AUDITING 
 
1. The command adequately reviews and updates safety procedures. 
2. The command monitors maintainer qualifications and has a program that 
targets training deficiencies. 
3. The command uses safety and medical staff to identify/manage personnel at 
risk. 
4. CDIs/QARs routinely monitor maintenance evolutions. 
5. Tool Control and support equipment licensing are closely monitored. 
6. Signing off personnel qualifications are taken seriously. 
 
B.  REWARD SYSTEM AND SAFETY CULTURE 
 
7. Our command climate promotes safe maintenance. 
8. Supervisors discourage SOP, NAMP or other procedure violations and 
encourage reporting safety concerns. 
9. Peer influence discourages SOP, NAMP or other violations and individuals 
feel free to report them. 
10. Violations of SOP, NAMP or other procedures are not common in this 
command. 
11. The command recognizes individual safety achievement through rewards and 
incentives. 
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12. Personnel are comfortable approaching supervisors about personal 
problems/illness. 
13. Safety NCO, QAR and CDI are sought after billets. 
        14.   Unprofessional behavior is not tolerated in the command. 
 
C.  QUALITY ASSURANCE 
 
15.  The command has a reputation for quality maintenance and set standards to     
       maintain quality  control. 
16.  QA and Safety are well respected and are seen as essential to mission 
       accomplishment. 
17.   QARs/CDIs sign-off after required actions are complete and are not pressured  
        by supervisors to sign-off. 
18.   Maintenance on detachments is of the same quality as that at home station. 
19.   Required publications/tools/equipment are available, current/serviceable and 
        used. 
20.   QARs are helpful, and QA is not "feared" in my unit. 
 
 
D.  RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
21.   Multiple job assignments and collateral duties adversely affect maintenance. 
22.   Safety is part of maintenance planning, and additional training/support is  
        provided as needed. 
23.   Supervisors recognize unsafe conditions and manage hazards associated with 
        maintenance and the flight-line. 
24.   I am provided adequate resources, time, personnel to accomplish my job. 
25.  Personnel turnover does not negatively impact the command's ability to operate 
        safely. 
26.  Supervisors are more concerned with safe maintenance than the flight schedule,  
       and do not  permit cutting corners. 
27.   Day/Night Check have equal workloads and staffing is sufficient on each shift. 
28.  Supervisors shield personnel from outside pressures and are aware of individual  
       workload. 
29.   Based upon my command's current assets/manning it is not over-committed. 
 
 
E.  COMMAND AND CONTROL 
 
30.   My command temporarily restricts maintainers who are having problems. 
31.   Safety decisions are made at the proper levels and work center supervisor 
       decisions are respected. 
32.  Supervisors communicate command safety goals and are actively engaged in 
       the safety  program. 
33.  Supervisors set the example for following maintenance standards and ensure 
    compliance.  
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         34.   In my command safety is a key part of all maintenance operations and all are  
              responsible/accountable for safety. 
         35.   Safety education and training are comprehensive and effective. 
         36.   All maintenance evolutions are properly briefed, supervised and staffed by 
      qualified personnel. 
         37.   Maintenance Control is effective in managing all maintenance activities. 
 
 
        F.  COMMUNICATION / FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
        38.   Good communication exists up/down the chain of command. 
        39.   I get all the information I need to do my job safely. 
        40.   Work center supervisors coordinate their actions. 
        41.   My command has effective pass-down between shifts. 
        42.   Maintenance Control troubleshoots/resolves gripes before flight. 
        43.   Maintainers are briefed on potential hazards associated with maintenance 
                activities. 
 
 




















































APPENDIX B.  ITEM MEANS BY UNIT  
 
Unit q1 q2 q3 q4 q5 q6 q7 q8 q9 q10 q11 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17 q18
A 4.50 4.34 4.21 4.50 4.43 4.39 4.59 4.33 3.94 4.33 3.51 4.11 3.87 4.09 4.57 4.52 4.39 4.31
B 4.24 4.07 3.99 4.35 4.17 4.16 4.26 4.01 3.57 3.76 3.02 3.90 3.77 3.88 4.60 4.17 3.87 4.01
C 4.00 3.91 3.74 4.00 4.11 3.82 4.07 3.93 3.68 3.63 3.14 3.98 3.82 3.76 3.93 3.96 3.88 3.79
D 3.70 3.67 3.14 3.93 3.60 3.70 3.50 3.28 3.21 3.10 2.59 3.66 3.28 2.87 3.40 3.87 3.54 3.37
E 4.14 4.13 3.98 4.30 4.33 3.72 3.86 3.90 3.54 3.59 3.46 3.75 3.68 3.54 4.25 3.85 3.75 3.98
F 3.93 3.81 3.60 4.07 4.02 3.67 3.98 3.60 3.24 3.45 3.15 3.89 3.08 3.79 3.67 3.48 3.57 3.23
G 4.07 4.00 3.81 4.15 4.14 3.77 4.08 3.92 3.71 3.75 3.57 3.87 3.54 4.00 4.20 3.94 3.74 3.72
H 3.78 3.84 3.66 4.17 3.80 3.67 3.67 3.72 3.52 3.38 2.99 3.71 3.19 3.52 3.70 3.78 3.37 3.25
I 4.17 4.07 3.97 4.45 4.14 3.90 4.17 3.55 3.54 3.97 4.00 3.90 3.55 3.83 4.34 4.03 3.86 3.93
J 3.88 3.81 3.54 4.16 3.91 3.76 3.86 3.73 3.53 3.61 2.74 3.63 3.38 3.69 4.15 3.82 3.81 3.95
K 3.71 4.05 3.65 4.10 3.95 3.67 4.10 3.55 3.45 3.61 3.38 3.95 3.10 3.81 4.19 3.62 3.86 4.28
L 3.90 3.73 3.52 4.11 3.61 3.62 3.53 3.61 3.44 3.26 3.06 3.53 3.17 3.14 3.85 3.30 3.44 3.35
M 3.78 3.66 3.38 3.93 3.57 3.49 3.50 3.48 3.40 3.22 2.77 3.73 3.25 3.56 4.00 3.79 3.60 3.12
N 4.06 4.01 3.82 4.16 3.92 3.79 4.04 3.86 3.55 3.61 3.30 3.78 3.70 3.94 4.18 3.96 3.86 3.85
O 4.12 4.02 3.79 4.22 4.18 3.98 3.99 4.02 3.72 3.64 3.37 3.91 3.57 3.87 3.94 3.97 3.90 3.79
P 3.83 3.23 3.17 4.05 3.68 3.39 3.13 3.48 3.29 3.45 3.10 3.52 3.62 3.26 3.70 3.57 3.50 3.05
Q 3.80 3.46 3.29 4.17 3.83 3.85 3.22 3.55 3.29 3.15 2.38 3.40 3.22 3.47 3.99 3.60 3.11 3.48
R 4.05 3.86 3.64 4.36 4.11 4.11 4.18 3.95 3.62 3.61 3.02 3.73 3.69 3.71 4.44 4.00 3.57 3.71
S 4.03 4.05 3.94 4.16 4.11 3.63 4.26 4.10 3.77 3.69 3.68 4.00 4.00 3.85 4.13 4.08 4.00 3.52
T 4.23 4.03 3.88 4.07 4.05 3.61 3.66 3.68 3.55 3.38 3.46 3.60 3.25 3.59 4.05 3.78 3.53 3.51
U 3.80 3.13 3.62 4.04 3.74 3.68 3.57 3.70 3.41 3.26 2.52 3.70 3.38 3.43 3.04 3.65 3.52 3.48
V 4.09 3.93 3.52 4.24 4.10 3.97 4.04 3.81 3.70 3.86 3.00 3.89 3.67 3.71 4.40 4.00 4.01 3.97
W 4.08 3.72 3.55 4.16 3.83 3.47 4.02 3.89 3.53 3.44 3.58 3.59 3.15 3.43 3.95 3.82 3.73 3.49
Y 4.05 3.82 3.71 4.29 3.94 3.76 4.06 3.96 3.51 3.79 3.56 3.98 3.63 3.59 4.26 3.91 3.87 3.78
Z 4.18 3.90 3.54 4.37 4.13 3.80 3.97 3.62 3.50 3.68 3.47 3.87 3.34 3.68 4.40 4.03 3.96 3.83
AA 4.04 3.92 3.88 4.50 4.13 3.83 4.29 4.05 3.48 3.83 3.54 3.79 3.52 3.92 4.38 4.00 3.96 3.85








Unit q19 q20 q21 q22 q23 q24 q25 q26 q27 q28 q29 q30 q31 q32 q33 q34 q35 q36
A 4.04 4.54 3.19 4.30 4.38 3.80 3.70 4.34 3.36 3.96 3.58 4.02 4.29 4.35 4.36 4.42 4.16 4.11
B 3.77 4.10 3.21 4.09 4.23 3.51 3.64 3.64 3.09 3.66 3.52 3.55 3.88 4.09 3.98 4.15 4.04 3.82
C 3.64 3.76 3.56 3.91 3.98 3.73 3.68 3.49 3.51 3.67 3.55 3.71 3.78 3.71 3.76 3.96 3.84 3.73
D 2.63 3.90 3.96 3.50 3.80 2.61 2.50 3.18 1.93 3.37 2.54 3.00 2.82 3.53 3.52 3.55 3.30 3.10
E 3.86 3.78 3.30 3.88 4.03 2.97 3.24 3.43 2.53 3.40 2.68 3.12 3.63 3.90 4.00 3.83 3.88 3.78
F 3.59 3.76 3.33 3.80 3.77 3.28 3.02 3.58 2.50 3.56 2.51 3.28 3.80 3.73 3.81 3.83 3.64 3.49
G 3.58 3.87 3.47 3.99 3.97 3.19 3.28 3.84 2.53 3.42 2.79 3.35 3.82 3.93 3.89 4.12 3.84 3.67
H 3.54 3.89 3.78 3.75 4.06 2.88 2.81 3.18 1.82 3.22 2.42 3.20 3.20 3.73 3.74 3.87 3.55 3.43
I 3.48 4.14 3.52 4.07 4.17 2.97 3.28 3.55 2.21 3.48 2.07 3.29 3.86 3.86 3.72 4.03 3.72 3.69
J 3.42 3.91 3.40 3.69 3.88 3.37 3.31 3.45 2.72 3.36 3.21 3.19 3.45 3.63 3.85 3.75 3.76 3.72
K 3.86 3.55 3.15 3.71 4.10 3.71 3.48 3.71 2.71 3.62 3.35 3.07 3.95 3.80 3.86 3.76 3.67 3.48
L 3.67 3.62 3.35 3.56 3.78 2.93 3.04 2.83 2.72 3.25 2.94 3.08 3.40 3.53 3.56 3.57 3.59 3.32
M 3.56 4.04 3.41 3.59 3.81 2.48 3.04 3.21 2.21 3.32 2.40 2.98 3.65 3.63 3.70 3.50 3.48 3.23
N 3.83 3.76 3.48 3.95 3.89 3.24 3.62 3.60 2.44 3.22 3.08 3.40 3.70 3.87 3.87 4.08 3.87 3.62
O 3.52 3.99 3.29 3.95 4.12 3.35 3.50 3.71 2.61 3.47 3.05 3.39 3.62 3.86 3.96 4.00 3.90 3.70
P 3.43 3.78 3.61 3.22 3.70 2.57 2.74 3.09 2.05 3.10 2.29 2.88 3.00 3.48 3.22 3.43 3.48 2.77
Q 2.70 3.54 3.57 3.50 3.71 2.67 3.03 2.82 2.32 3.14 2.74 3.02 3.24 3.47 3.56 3.60 3.33 3.25
R 2.82 3.96 3.16 4.00 4.09 2.93 3.24 3.61 2.49 3.56 3.05 3.56 3.84 3.82 3.89 4.00 3.76 3.47
S 3.79 3.92 3.03 4.03 3.97 3.31 3.26 4.08 2.70 3.47 3.06 3.43 4.05 3.81 3.71 4.18 3.71 4.30
T 3.33 3.61 3.47 3.84 4.02 2.68 2.98 3.43 2.19 3.27 2.54 3.17 3.10 3.79 3.75 4.02 3.77 3.56
U 3.26 3.78 3.52 3.30 3.65 2.35 2.26 3.32 2.53 3.30 2.35 3.29 3.09 3.43 3.57 3.57 3.26 2.83
V 3.87 3.88 2.96 3.97 4.14 3.41 3.52 3.74 2.94 3.66 2.81 3.48 3.68 4.00 3.93 4.07 3.90 3.71
W 3.30 3.73 3.65 4.02 3.90 3.14 3.35 3.56 2.94 3.50 3.14 3.22 3.57 3.92 3.82 4.09 3.84 3.81
Y 3.94 3.89 3.05 3.89 4.09 3.49 3.15 3.76 2.64 3.56 3.08 3.22 3.65 3.90 3.93 4.06 3.85 3.81
Z 3.62 4.03 3.60 3.93 4.17 3.00 3.13 3.57 2.50 3.37 2.69 3.48 3.53 4.00 3.97 4.00 3.80 3.70
AA 4.17 3.96 3.25 4.13 4.04 3.75 3.79 3.83 2.88 3.88 3.00 3.30 3.79 3.83 4.04 4.13 3.88 3.63










Unit q37 q38 q39 q40 q41 q42 q43
A 3.96 3.89 4.16 4.13 4.35 4.11 4.27
B 3.24 3.41 4.05 3.72 4.05 3.55 4.07
C 3.38 3.56 3.91 3.69 3.67 3.84 3.69
D 2.83 2.24 3.52 3.00 3.14 3.59 3.55
E 3.42 3.24 3.72 3.69 3.80 3.78 3.83
F 3.66 3.41 3.65 3.80 3.89 3.62 3.67
G 3.93 3.45 3.73 3.71 3.70 4.00 3.98
H 3.25 2.78 3.51 3.54 3.16 3.61 3.62
I 3.86 3.66 3.86 3.79 3.79 3.79 3.86
J 3.56 2.56 3.57 3.70 3.55 3.65 3.80
K 3.43 3.05 3.62 3.80 3.19 3.68 3.90
L 3.11 2.79 3.53 3.56 3.42 3.55 3.63 
M 3.36 2.70 3.45 3.60 3.59 3.64 3.66
N 3.64 3.36 3.74 3.66 3.61 3.90 3.72
O 3.46 3.15 3.68 3.79 3.68 3.72 3.84
P 3.04 2.64 3.13 3.30 3.35 3.33 3.27
Q 2.93 2.38 3.35 3.38 3.33 3.31 3.39
R 3.33 3.13 3.75 3.98 3.24 3.45 3.82
S 4.16 3.46 3.95 3.79 3.91 4.05 4.27
T 3.14 2.31 3.46 3.38 3.43 3.76 3.91
U 2.52 2.57 3.61 3.48 3.80 3.55 3.96
V 3.51 3.21 3.81 3.69 3.81 3.71 3.99
W 3.66 2.63 3.73 3.72 3.60 3.60 4.02
Y 3.48 3.25 3.82 3.56 3.83 3.86 4.00
Z 3.21 2.84 3.67 3.90 3.77 3.79 3.83
AA 3.71 3.29 3.83 3.75 3.54 3.77 4.00












































































































+ weights = SquadDem2$N)
> tmnaov_anova(aov(Avg~Squad+Comp, data = tmn1, weights = tmn1$weights))
> tmnaov
Analysis of Variance Table
Response: Avg
Terms added sequentially (first to last)
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Squad 26 405.3787 15.59149 42.7584 0
Comp 5 343.6180 68.72360 188.4690 0
Residuals 130 47.4034 0.36464
> tapply(tm1[,"Avg"],tm1[,"Comp"],mean)
CC2 CF2 PA2 QA2 RM2 RS2
3.659967 3.597181 3.922172 3.812685 3.350434 3.631256
> boxplot(split(tm1[,"Avg"],tm1[,"Squad"]))
> aovn1_anova(aov(Avg~Squad+Comp, data = tm1, weights=tmn1$weights))
> aovn1_anova(aov(Avg~Squad+Comp, data = tmn1, weights=tmn1$weights))
> aovn2_aov(Avg~Squad+Comp, data = tmn1, weights=tmn1$weights)
> mult1n_multicomp(aovn2, focus = "Comp", method="tukey", plot=T)
> mult1n
95 % simultaneous confidence intervals for specified
linear combinations, by the Tukey method
critical point: 2.8927
response variable: Avg
intervals excluding 0 are flagged by '****'
Estimate Std.Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
CC2-CF2 0.0794 0.0202 0.0209 0.1380 ****
CC2-PA2 -0.2620 0.0202 -0.3200 -0.2030 ****
CC2-QA2 -0.1330 0.0202 -0.1910 -0.0741 ****
CC2-RM2 0.3150 0.0202 0.2560 0.3730 ****
CC2-RS2 0.0399 0.0202 -0.0186 0.0985
CF2-PA2 -0.3410 0.0202 -0.4000 -0.2830 ****
CF2-QA2 -0.2120 0.0202 -0.2700 -0.1530 ****
CF2-RM2 0.2350 0.0202 0.1770 0.2940 ****
CF2-RS2 -0.0394 0.0202 -0.0979 0.0191
PA2-QA2 0.1290 0.0202 0.0706 0.1880 ****
PA2-RM2 0.5770 0.0202 0.5180 0.6350 ****
PA2-RS2 0.3020 0.0202 0.2430 0.3600 ****
QA2-RM2 0.4470 0.0202 0.3890 0.5060 ****
QA2-RS2 0.1730 0.0202 0.1140 0.2310 ****
RM2-RS2 -0.2750 0.0202 -0.3330 -0.2160 ****
> aovn1
Analysis of Variance Table
Response: Avg
Terms added sequentially (first to last)
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Squad 26 405.3787 15.59149 42.7584 0
Comp 5 343.6180 68.72360 188.4690 0
Residuals 130 47.4034 0.36464
> summary(aovn1)
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Min.: 5.00 Min.: 47.4 Min.: 0.3646 Min.: 42.76 Min.:0
1st Qu.: 15.50 1st Qu.:195.5 1st Qu.: 7.9780 1st Qu.: 79.19 1st Qu.:0
58 
Median: 26.00 Median:343.6 Median:15.5900 Median:115.60 Median:0
Mean: 53.67 Mean:265.5 Mean:28.2300 Mean:115.60 Mean:0
3rd Qu.: 78.00 3rd Qu.:374.5 3rd Qu.:42.1600 3rd Qu.:152.00 3rd Qu.:0




aov(formula = Avg ~ Squad + Comp, data = tmn1, weights = tmn1$weights)
Terms:
Squad Comp Residuals
Sum of Squares 405.3787 343.6180 0.8796
Deg. of Freedom 26 5 130
Residual standard error: 0.08225805
Estimated effects may be unbalanced
> summary(aovn2)
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Squad 26 405.3787 15.59149 42.7584 0
Comp 5 343.6180 68.72360 188.4690 0
Residuals 130 47.4034 0.36464
>
mult2_multicomp(aovn2, focus = "Squad", method="tukey", plot = T)
> mult2
95 % simultaneous confidence intervals for specified
linear combinations, by the Tukey method
critical point: 3.7796
response variable: Avg
intervals excluding 0 are flagged by '****'
Estimate Std.Error Lower Bound Upper Bound
1-10 0.575000 0.0441 0.408000 0.74100 ****
1-11 0.508000 0.0628 0.271000 0.74500 ****
1-12 0.752000 0.0415 0.595000 0.90800 ****
1-13 0.733000 0.0444 0.565000 0.90100 ****
1-14 0.446000 0.0410 0.291000 0.60100 ****
1-15 0.429000 0.0362 0.292000 0.56600 ****
1-16 0.900000 0.0582 0.680000 1.12000 ****
1-17 0.865000 0.0403 0.712000 1.02000 ****
1-18 0.500000 0.0487 0.316000 0.68400 ****
1-19 0.330000 0.0503 0.140000 0.52100 ****
1-2 0.310000 0.0411 0.155000 0.46500 ****
1-20 0.647000 0.0456 0.475000 0.81900 ****
1-21 0.829000 0.0574 0.612000 1.05000 ****
1-22 0.400000 0.0432 0.237000 0.56300 ****
1-23 0.548000 0.0402 0.397000 0.70000 ****
1-24 0.419000 0.0421 0.260000 0.57800 ****
1-25 0.468000 0.0548 0.261000 0.67600 ****
1-26 0.347000 0.0598 0.121000 0.57300 ****
1-27 0.163000 0.0598 -0.063200 0.38900
1-3 0.410000 0.0484 0.227000 0.59200 ****
1-4 0.902000 0.0554 0.693000 1.11000 ****
1-5 0.461000 0.0450 0.291000 0.63100 ****
1-6 0.598000 0.0478 0.417000 0.77800 ****
1-7 0.412000 0.0410 0.257000 0.56700 ****
1-8 0.699000 0.0413 0.543000 0.85600 ****
1-9 0.399000 0.0561 0.187000 0.61100 ****
10-11 -0.066400 0.0615 -0.299000 0.16600
10-12 0.177000 0.0396 0.027200 0.32700 ****
10-13 0.159000 0.0426 -0.002430 0.32000
10-14 -0.129000 0.0391 -0.276000 0.01890
10-15 -0.146000 0.0340 -0.274000 -0.01740 ****
10-16 0.325000 0.0568 0.110000 0.54000 ****
10-17 0.290000 0.0383 0.145000 0.43500 ****
10-18 -0.075100 0.0471 -0.253000 0.10300
10-19 -0.244000 0.0487 -0.428000 -0.06000 ****
10-2 -0.265000 0.0392 -0.413000 -0.11700 ****
10-20 0.072200 0.0439 -0.093500 0.23800
59 
10-21 0.255000 0.0561 0.042800 0.46700 ****
10-22 -0.175000 0.0414 -0.331000 -0.01820 ****
10-23 -0.026100 0.0382 -0.171000 0.11800
10-24 -0.155000 0.0402 -0.307000 -0.00339 ****
10-25 -0.106000 0.0534 -0.308000 0.09580
10-26 -0.227000 0.0585 -0.449000 -0.00627 ****
10-27 -0.412000 0.0585 -0.633000 -0.19000 ****
10-3 -0.165000 0.0468 -0.342000 0.01160
10-4 0.327000 0.0540 0.123000 0.53200 ****
10-5 -0.113000 0.0433 -0.277000 0.05010
10-6 0.023000 0.0462 -0.152000 0.19800
10-7 -0.163000 0.0391 -0.311000 -0.01510 ****
10-8 0.125000 0.0394 -0.024100 0.27400
10-9 -0.175000 0.0547 -0.382000 0.03130
11-12 0.243000 0.0597 0.017600 0.46900 ****
11-13 0.225000 0.0618 -0.008430 0.45800
11-14 -0.062300 0.0594 -0.287000 0.16200
11-15 -0.079300 0.0562 -0.292000 0.13300
11-16 0.391000 0.0723 0.118000 0.66500 ****
11-17 0.356000 0.0589 0.134000 0.57900 ****
11-18 -0.008620 0.0649 -0.254000 0.23700
11-19 -0.178000 0.0662 -0.428000 0.07230
11-2 -0.198000 0.0594 -0.423000 0.02630
11-20 0.139000 0.0626 -0.098100 0.37500
11-21 0.321000 0.0717 0.050100 0.59200 ****
11-22 -0.108000 0.0610 -0.339000 0.12200
11-23 0.040300 0.0588 -0.182000 0.26300
11-24 -0.088900 0.0601 -0.316000 0.13800
11-25 -0.039700 0.0697 -0.303000 0.22400
11-26 -0.161000 0.0737 -0.439000 0.11700
11-27 -0.345000 0.0737 -0.624000 -0.06680 ****
11-3 -0.098700 0.0647 -0.343000 0.14600
11-4 0.394000 0.0701 0.129000 0.65900 ****
11-5 -0.047100 0.0622 -0.282000 0.18800
11-6 0.089500 0.0643 -0.154000 0.33200
11-7 -0.096400 0.0594 -0.321000 0.12800
11-8 0.191000 0.0596 -0.034000 0.41700
11-9 -0.109000 0.0706 -0.376000 0.15800
12-13 -0.018400 0.0400 -0.169000 0.13300
12-14 -0.306000 0.0362 -0.442000 -0.16900 ****
12-15 -0.323000 0.0306 -0.438000 -0.20700 ****
12-16 0.148000 0.0549 -0.059400 0.35600
12-17 0.113000 0.0353 -0.020500 0.24700
12-18 -0.252000 0.0447 -0.421000 -0.08310 ****
12-19 -0.421000 0.0464 -0.597000 -0.24600 ****
12-2 -0.442000 0.0363 -0.579000 -0.30500 ****
12-20 -0.105000 0.0413 -0.261000 0.05140
12-21 0.077800 0.0541 -0.127000 0.28200
12-22 -0.352000 0.0387 -0.498000 -0.20500 ****
12-23 -0.203000 0.0353 -0.336000 -0.06980 ****
12-24 -0.332000 0.0374 -0.474000 -0.19100 ****
12-25 -0.283000 0.0513 -0.477000 -0.08900 ****
12-26 -0.404000 0.0566 -0.618000 -0.19000 ****
12-27 -0.589000 0.0566 -0.803000 -0.37500 ****
12-3 -0.342000 0.0444 -0.510000 -0.17400 ****
12-4 0.151000 0.0520 -0.045900 0.34700
12-5 -0.290000 0.0407 -0.444000 -0.13700 ****
12-6 -0.154000 0.0438 -0.319000 0.01150
12-7 -0.340000 0.0362 -0.476000 -0.20300 ****
12-8 -0.052100 0.0365 -0.190000 0.08610
12-9 -0.352000 0.0526 -0.551000 -0.15300 ****
13-14 -0.287000 0.0394 -0.436000 -0.13800 ****
13-15 -0.304000 0.0344 -0.434000 -0.17400 ****
13-16 0.166000 0.0571 -0.049300 0.38200
13-17 0.131000 0.0387 -0.014600 0.27800
13-18 -0.234000 0.0473 -0.413000 -0.05470 ****
13-19 -0.403000 0.0490 -0.588000 -0.21800 ****
13-2 -0.423000 0.0395 -0.573000 -0.27400 ****
13-20 -0.086300 0.0442 -0.253000 0.08060
13-21 0.096100 0.0563 -0.117000 0.30900
13-22 -0.333000 0.0417 -0.491000 -0.17600 ****
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13-23 -0.185000 0.0386 -0.331000 -0.03890 ****
13-24 -0.314000 0.0406 -0.467000 -0.16100 ****
13-25 -0.265000 0.0537 -0.468000 -0.06180 ****
13-26 -0.386000 0.0588 -0.608000 -0.16400 ****
13-27 -0.570000 0.0588 -0.792000 -0.34800 ****
13-3 -0.324000 0.0471 -0.502000 -0.14600 ****
13-4 0.169000 0.0543 -0.036300 0.37400
13-5 -0.272000 0.0436 -0.437000 -0.10700 ****
13-6 -0.136000 0.0465 -0.311000 0.04020
13-7 -0.321000 0.0394 -0.470000 -0.17200 ****
13-8 -0.033700 0.0398 -0.184000 0.11700
13-9 -0.334000 0.0549 -0.542000 -0.12600 ****
14-15 -0.017000 0.0299 -0.130000 0.09600
14-16 0.454000 0.0545 0.248000 0.66000 ****
14-17 0.419000 0.0347 0.288000 0.55000 ****
14-18 0.053700 0.0442 -0.113000 0.22100
14-19 -0.115000 0.0460 -0.289000 0.05840
14-2 -0.136000 0.0357 -0.271000 -0.00118 ****
14-20 0.201000 0.0408 0.046900 0.35500 ****
14-21 0.383000 0.0537 0.181000 0.58600 ****
14-22 -0.045900 0.0381 -0.190000 0.09820
14-23 0.103000 0.0347 -0.028300 0.23400
14-24 -0.026600 0.0368 -0.166000 0.11300
14-25 0.022600 0.0509 -0.170000 0.21500
14-26 -0.098700 0.0563 -0.311000 0.11400
14-27 -0.283000 0.0563 -0.496000 -0.07030 ****
14-3 -0.036300 0.0439 -0.202000 0.13000
14-4 0.456000 0.0516 0.261000 0.65100 ****
14-5 0.015300 0.0402 -0.137000 0.16700
14-6 0.152000 0.0433 -0.011800 0.31500
14-7 -0.034000 0.0356 -0.169000 0.10000
14-8 0.254000 0.0360 0.118000 0.39000 ****
14-9 -0.046600 0.0522 -0.244000 0.15100
15-16 0.471000 0.0510 0.278000 0.66300 ****
15-17 0.436000 0.0289 0.327000 0.54500 ****
15-18 0.070700 0.0398 -0.079600 0.22100
15-19 -0.098500 0.0417 -0.256000 0.05930
15-2 -0.119000 0.0300 -0.232000 -0.00571 ****
15-20 0.218000 0.0359 0.082200 0.35400 ****
15-21 0.400000 0.0501 0.211000 0.59000 ****
15-22 -0.029000 0.0329 -0.153000 0.09530
15-23 0.120000 0.0288 0.010900 0.22800 ****
15-24 -0.009650 0.0314 -0.128000 0.10900
15-25 0.039600 0.0471 -0.139000 0.21800
15-26 -0.081800 0.0528 -0.281000 0.11800
15-27 -0.266000 0.0528 -0.466000 -0.06620 ****
15-3 -0.019400 0.0394 -0.168000 0.13000
15-4 0.473000 0.0478 0.292000 0.65400 ****
15-5 0.032200 0.0352 -0.101000 0.16500
15-6 0.169000 0.0387 0.022400 0.31500 ****
15-7 -0.017100 0.0299 -0.130000 0.09580
15-8 0.271000 0.0303 0.156000 0.38500 ****
15-9 -0.029600 0.0485 -0.213000 0.15400
16-17 -0.035000 0.0540 -0.239000 0.16900
16-18 -0.400000 0.0605 -0.629000 -0.17100 ****
16-19 -0.569000 0.0618 -0.803000 -0.33600 ****
16-2 -0.590000 0.0546 -0.796000 -0.38400 ****
16-20 -0.253000 0.0580 -0.472000 -0.03350 ****
16-21 -0.070300 0.0677 -0.326000 0.18600
16-22 -0.500000 0.0562 -0.712000 -0.28700 ****
16-23 -0.351000 0.0539 -0.555000 -0.14700 ****
16-24 -0.480000 0.0553 -0.690000 -0.27100 ****
16-25 -0.431000 0.0656 -0.679000 -0.18300 ****
16-26 -0.553000 0.0698 -0.816000 -0.28900 ****
16-27 -0.737000 0.0698 -1.000000 -0.47300 ****
16-3 -0.490000 0.0603 -0.718000 -0.26200 ****
16-4 0.002400 0.0661 -0.247000 0.25200
16-5 -0.439000 0.0576 -0.656000 -0.22100 ****
16-6 -0.302000 0.0598 -0.528000 -0.07590 ****
16-7 -0.488000 0.0545 -0.694000 -0.28200 ****
16-8 -0.200000 0.0548 -0.407000 0.00679
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16-9 -0.500000 0.0666 -0.752000 -0.24900 ****
17-18 -0.365000 0.0435 -0.530000 -0.20100 ****
17-19 -0.534000 0.0453 -0.706000 -0.36300 ****
17-2 -0.555000 0.0348 -0.686000 -0.42300 ****
17-20 -0.218000 0.0400 -0.369000 -0.06640 ****
17-21 -0.035300 0.0531 -0.236000 0.16600
17-22 -0.465000 0.0373 -0.606000 -0.32400 ****
17-23 -0.316000 0.0338 -0.444000 -0.18800 ****
17-24 -0.445000 0.0360 -0.582000 -0.30900 ****
17-25 -0.396000 0.0503 -0.586000 -0.20600 ****
17-26 -0.518000 0.0557 -0.728000 -0.30700 ****
17-27 -0.702000 0.0557 -0.912000 -0.49100 ****
17-3 -0.455000 0.0432 -0.618000 -0.29200 ****
17-4 0.037400 0.0510 -0.155000 0.23000
17-5 -0.404000 0.0394 -0.552000 -0.25500 ****
17-6 -0.267000 0.0426 -0.428000 -0.10600 ****
17-7 -0.453000 0.0347 -0.584000 -0.32200 ****
17-8 -0.165000 0.0351 -0.298000 -0.03240 ****
17-9 -0.465000 0.0517 -0.661000 -0.27000 ****
18-19 -0.169000 0.0529 -0.369000 0.03100
18-2 -0.190000 0.0443 -0.357000 -0.02240 ****
18-20 0.147000 0.0485 -0.036000 0.33100
18-21 0.330000 0.0598 0.104000 0.55600 ****
18-22 -0.099600 0.0463 -0.275000 0.07530
18-23 0.048900 0.0435 -0.115000 0.21300
18-24 -0.080300 0.0452 -0.251000 0.09060
18-25 -0.031100 0.0573 -0.248000 0.18500
18-26 -0.152000 0.0621 -0.387000 0.08220
18-27 -0.337000 0.0621 -0.571000 -0.10200 ****
18-3 -0.090000 0.0511 -0.283000 0.10300
18-4 0.403000 0.0579 0.184000 0.62100 ****
18-5 -0.038400 0.0480 -0.220000 0.14300
18-6 0.098100 0.0506 -0.093200 0.28900
18-7 -0.087700 0.0442 -0.255000 0.07930
18-8 0.200000 0.0445 0.031700 0.36800 ****
18-9 -0.100000 0.0585 -0.321000 0.12100
19-2 -0.020600 0.0461 -0.195000 0.15400
19-20 0.316000 0.0501 0.127000 0.50600 ****
19-21 0.499000 0.0611 0.268000 0.73000 ****
19-22 0.069500 0.0480 -0.112000 0.25100
19-23 0.218000 0.0453 0.046900 0.38900 ****
19-24 0.088800 0.0470 -0.088700 0.26600
19-25 0.138000 0.0587 -0.083700 0.36000
19-26 0.016700 0.0634 -0.223000 0.25600
19-27 -0.167000 0.0634 -0.407000 0.07200
19-3 0.079100 0.0527 -0.120000 0.27800
19-4 0.572000 0.0592 0.348000 0.79600 ****
19-5 0.131000 0.0496 -0.056800 0.31800
19-6 0.267000 0.0522 0.070000 0.46400 ****
19-7 0.081400 0.0460 -0.092400 0.25500
19-8 0.369000 0.0463 0.194000 0.54400 ****
19-9 0.068900 0.0598 -0.157000 0.29500
2-20 0.337000 0.0409 0.183000 0.49100 ****
2-21 0.520000 0.0538 0.316000 0.72300 ****
2-22 0.090100 0.0382 -0.054400 0.23500
2-23 0.239000 0.0348 0.107000 0.37000 ****
2-24 0.109000 0.0369 -0.030100 0.24900
2-25 0.159000 0.0510 -0.034100 0.35100
2-26 0.037300 0.0563 -0.176000 0.25000
2-27 -0.147000 0.0563 -0.360000 0.06600
2-3 0.099700 0.0440 -0.066500 0.26600
2-4 0.592000 0.0516 0.397000 0.78700 ****
2-5 0.151000 0.0402 -0.000825 0.30300
2-6 0.288000 0.0434 0.124000 0.45200 ****
2-7 0.102000 0.0357 -0.032900 0.23700
2-8 0.390000 0.0361 0.253000 0.52600 ****
2-9 0.089400 0.0523 -0.108000 0.28700
20-21 0.182000 0.0573 -0.034000 0.39900
20-22 -0.247000 0.0430 -0.410000 -0.08430 ****
20-23 -0.098400 0.0400 -0.249000 0.05270
20-24 -0.228000 0.0419 -0.386000 -0.06930 ****
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20-25 -0.178000 0.0547 -0.385000 0.02830
20-26 -0.300000 0.0597 -0.525000 -0.07410 ****
20-27 -0.484000 0.0597 -0.710000 -0.25800 ****
20-3 -0.237000 0.0482 -0.420000 -0.05520 ****
20-4 0.255000 0.0553 0.046300 0.46400 ****
20-5 -0.186000 0.0448 -0.355000 -0.01630 ****
20-6 -0.049200 0.0476 -0.229000 0.13100
20-7 -0.235000 0.0408 -0.389000 -0.08090 ****
20-8 0.052600 0.0411 -0.103000 0.20800
20-9 -0.248000 0.0559 -0.459000 -0.03630 ****
21-22 -0.429000 0.0554 -0.639000 -0.22000 ****
21-23 -0.281000 0.0531 -0.482000 -0.08020 ****
21-24 -0.410000 0.0545 -0.616000 -0.20400 ****
21-25 -0.361000 0.0649 -0.606000 -0.11600 ****
21-26 -0.482000 0.0692 -0.744000 -0.22100 ****
21-27 -0.666000 0.0692 -0.928000 -0.40500 ****
21-3 -0.420000 0.0595 -0.645000 -0.19500 ****
21-4 0.072700 0.0654 -0.174000 0.32000
21-5 -0.368000 0.0568 -0.583000 -0.15300 ****
21-6 -0.232000 0.0591 -0.455000 -0.00838 ****
21-7 -0.418000 0.0537 -0.621000 -0.21500 ****
21-8 -0.130000 0.0540 -0.334000 0.07410
21-9 -0.430000 0.0659 -0.679000 -0.18100 ****
22-23 0.149000 0.0373 0.007690 0.28900 ****
22-24 0.019300 0.0393 -0.129000 0.16800
22-25 0.068600 0.0527 -0.131000 0.26800
22-26 -0.052800 0.0579 -0.272000 0.16600
22-27 -0.237000 0.0579 -0.456000 -0.01810 ****
22-3 0.009610 0.0460 -0.164000 0.18300
22-4 0.502000 0.0534 0.300000 0.70400 ****
22-5 0.061200 0.0424 -0.099200 0.22200
22-6 0.198000 0.0454 0.026100 0.36900 ****
22-7 0.011900 0.0381 -0.132000 0.15600
22-8 0.300000 0.0385 0.154000 0.44500 ****
22-9 -0.000643 0.0540 -0.205000 0.20300
23-24 -0.129000 0.0359 -0.265000 0.00658
23-25 -0.080000 0.0503 -0.270000 0.11000
23-26 -0.201000 0.0557 -0.412000 0.00909
23-27 -0.386000 0.0557 -0.596000 -0.17500 ****
23-3 -0.139000 0.0431 -0.302000 0.02410
23-4 0.354000 0.0509 0.161000 0.54600 ****
23-5 -0.087400 0.0393 -0.236000 0.06140
23-6 0.049200 0.0425 -0.112000 0.21000
23-7 -0.137000 0.0347 -0.268000 -0.00569 ****
23-8 0.151000 0.0351 0.018500 0.28300 ****
23-9 -0.149000 0.0516 -0.344000 0.04590
24-25 0.049200 0.0518 -0.147000 0.24500
24-26 -0.072100 0.0571 -0.288000 0.14400
24-27 -0.256000 0.0571 -0.472000 -0.04060 ****
24-3 -0.009720 0.0449 -0.179000 0.16000
24-4 0.483000 0.0524 0.285000 0.68100 ****
24-5 0.041900 0.0413 -0.114000 0.19800
24-6 0.178000 0.0443 0.010900 0.34600 ****
24-7 -0.007430 0.0368 -0.147000 0.13200
24-8 0.280000 0.0372 0.140000 0.42100 ****
24-9 -0.020000 0.0531 -0.221000 0.18100
25-26 -0.121000 0.0670 -0.375000 0.13200
25-27 -0.306000 0.0670 -0.559000 -0.05220 ****
25-3 -0.058900 0.0570 -0.275000 0.15700
25-4 0.434000 0.0631 0.195000 0.67200 ****
25-5 -0.007350 0.0542 -0.212000 0.19800
25-6 0.129000 0.0566 -0.084700 0.34300
25-7 -0.056700 0.0509 -0.249000 0.13600
25-8 0.231000 0.0512 0.037500 0.42500 ****
25-9 -0.069200 0.0637 -0.310000 0.17200
26-27 -0.184000 0.0712 -0.453000 0.08480
26-3 0.062400 0.0618 -0.171000 0.29600
26-4 0.555000 0.0675 0.300000 0.81000 ****
26-5 0.114000 0.0593 -0.110000 0.33800
26-6 0.251000 0.0614 0.018400 0.48300 ****
26-7 0.064700 0.0563 -0.148000 0.27700
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26-8 0.352000 0.0565 0.139000 0.56600 ****
26-9 0.052100 0.0680 -0.205000 0.30900
27-3 0.247000 0.0618 0.012800 0.48000 ****
27-4 0.739000 0.0675 0.484000 0.99400 ****
27-5 0.298000 0.0593 0.074200 0.52200 ****
27-6 0.435000 0.0614 0.203000 0.66700 ****
27-7 0.249000 0.0563 0.036200 0.46200 ****
27-8 0.537000 0.0565 0.323000 0.75000 ****
27-9 0.236000 0.0680 -0.020800 0.49300
3-4 0.493000 0.0576 0.275000 0.71000 ****
3-5 0.051600 0.0477 -0.129000 0.23200
3-6 0.188000 0.0503 -0.002120 0.37800
3-7 0.002280 0.0439 -0.164000 0.16800
3-8 0.290000 0.0442 0.123000 0.45700 ****
3-9 -0.010300 0.0582 -0.230000 0.21000
4-5 -0.441000 0.0548 -0.648000 -0.23400 ****
4-6 -0.304000 0.0571 -0.520000 -0.08840 ****
4-7 -0.490000 0.0516 -0.685000 -0.29500 ****
4-8 -0.203000 0.0518 -0.398000 -0.00667 ****
4-9 -0.503000 0.0642 -0.745000 -0.26000 ****
5-6 0.137000 0.0471 -0.041600 0.31500
5-7 -0.049300 0.0402 -0.201000 0.10200
5-8 0.238000 0.0405 0.085300 0.39100 ****
5-9 -0.061900 0.0555 -0.271000 0.14800
6-7 -0.186000 0.0433 -0.349000 -0.02220 ****
6-8 0.102000 0.0436 -0.062900 0.26700
6-9 -0.198000 0.0578 -0.417000 0.01990
7-8 0.288000 0.0360 0.152000 0.42400 ****
7-9 -0.012500 0.0522 -0.210000 0.18500







































APPENDIX E.  REGRESSION DATA 
*** Linear Model ***
Call: lm(formula = IR ~ Av2, data = SquadDem2, weights = N, na.action =
na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-874.1 -472 -283.7 63.26 6300
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 286.2731 618.7363 0.4627 0.6476
Av2 -61.3768 169.5128 -0.3621 0.7203
Residual standard error: 1387 on 25 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.005217
F-statistic: 0.1311 on 1 and 25 degrees of freedom, the p-value is
0.7203
Analysis of Variance Table
Response: IR
Terms added sequentially (first to last)
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Av2 1 252033 252033 0.1311004 0.7203365
Residuals 25 48061082 1922443                     
*** Linear Model ***
Call: lm(formula = IR ~ Avg, data = IRno900, na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-55.34 -45.41 -19.68 12.99 251.2
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 125.5060 230.7976 0.5438 0.5914
Avg -21.4207 63.2853 -0.3385 0.7378
Residual standard error: 70.45 on 25 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.004562
F-statistic: 0.1146 on 1 and 25 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0.7378
Analysis of Variance Table
Response: IR
Terms added sequentially (first to last)
Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F Value Pr(F)
Avg 1 568.6 568.621 0.1145679 0.7378286



























APPENDIX F.  SIMPLE AND REDUCED MODELS 
PA2.lm_lm(PA2~Rank2+WC2+Status+YrsExp+Shift+AC, data=ahindivid, na.action=na.exclude)
> summary(PA2.lm)
Call: lm(formula = PA2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-3.012 -0.2831 0.06063 0.3906 1.351
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.9430 0.0899 43.8445 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.0771 0.0509 -1.5137 0.1303
Rank2E89 0.1768 0.1162 1.5205 0.1286
Rank2Ofc 0.2026 0.0978 2.0714 0.0385
WC2Avionics -0.0557 0.0525 -1.0599 0.2893
WC2Flight Line 0.0557 0.0581 0.9576 0.3384
WC2Other 0.0274 0.0462 0.5926 0.5535
WC2Power Plants -0.0305 0.0673 -0.4526 0.6509
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.0613 0.0780 0.7855 0.4322
StatusRegular 0.0665 0.0497 1.3377 0.1812
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0794 0.0572 1.3879 0.1653
YrsExp16-20 0.0830 0.0592 1.4021 0.1611
YrsExp2-Jan 0.0946 0.0600 1.5768 0.1150
YrsExp20+ 0.0276 0.1085 0.2544 0.7992
YrsExp5-Mar -0.0205 0.0515 -0.3976 0.6909
YrsExp<1 0.1747 0.0711 2.4576 0.0141
Shift -0.0931 0.0353 -2.6401 0.0084
ACNonTac -0.0372 0.0435 -0.8540 0.3932
ACTactical -0.1348 0.0354 -3.8097 0.0001
Residual standard error: 0.6088 on 1702 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.05105
F-statistic: 5.086 on 18 and 1702 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 1.708e-011
10 observations deleted due to missing values
> PA2.lm.stepAIC_stepAIC(PA2.lm, trace=F)
> summary(PA2.lm.stepAIC)
Call: lm(formula = PA2 ~ Rank2 + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid, na.action =
na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.978 -0.2863 0.04703 0.3814 1.303
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 4.0074 0.0688 58.2105 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.0829 0.0503 -1.6494 0.0993
Rank2E89 0.1792 0.1156 1.5503 0.1212
Rank2Ofc 0.2086 0.0967 2.1579 0.0311
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0883 0.0568 1.5536 0.1205
YrsExp16-20 0.0998 0.0585 1.7057 0.0882
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1072 0.0597 1.7937 0.0730
YrsExp20+ 0.0505 0.1079 0.4686 0.6394
YrsExp5-Mar -0.0164 0.0514 -0.3197 0.7492
YrsExp<1 0.1979 0.0705 2.8062 0.0051
Shift -0.0940 0.0348 -2.7007 0.0070
ACNonTac -0.0598 0.0394 -1.5161 0.1297
ACTactical -0.1334 0.0352 -3.7939 0.0002
Residual standard error: 0.6091 on 1708 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.04694
F-statistic: 7.01 on 12 and 1708 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 1.466e-012
10 observations deleted due to missing values
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> RS2.lm_lm(RS2~Rank2+WC2+Status+YrsExp+Shift+AC, data=ahindivid, na.action=na.exclude)
> summary(RS2.lm)
Call: lm(formula = RS2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.82 -0.3505 0.04489 0.4426 1.554
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.6729 0.0957 38.3908 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1201 0.0541 -2.2199 0.0266
Rank2E89 0.2337 0.1238 1.8876 0.0592
Rank2Ofc 0.3579 0.1042 3.4358 0.0006
WC2Avionics -0.0181 0.0559 -0.3247 0.7454
WC2Flight Line 0.1180 0.0619 1.9057 0.0569
WC2Other 0.0298 0.0492 0.6054 0.5450
WC2Power Plants 0.0592 0.0718 0.8247 0.4097
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.1406 0.0824 1.7068 0.0880
StatusRegular 0.0101 0.0529 0.1901 0.8492
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0849 0.0608 1.3966 0.1627
YrsExp16-20 0.0845 0.0629 1.3423 0.1797
YrsExp2-Jan 0.0892 0.0638 1.3976 0.1624
YrsExp20+ -0.0718 0.1155 -0.6212 0.5346
YrsExp5-Mar -0.0750 0.0546 -1.3731 0.1699
YrsExp<1 0.3219 0.0753 4.2727 0.0000
Shift -0.0809 0.0375 -2.1572 0.0311
ACNonTac 0.0310 0.0463 0.6703 0.5028
ACTactical -0.1488 0.0377 -3.9483 0.0001
Residual standard error: 0.6487 on 1709 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.09315
F-statistic: 9.753 on 18 and 1709 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
3 observations deleted due to missing values
> RS2.lm.stepAIC_stepAIC(RS2.lm, trace=F)
> summary(RS2.lm.stepAIC)
Call: lm(formula = RS2 ~ Rank2 + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid, na.action =
na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.864 -0.3452 0.05439 0.4415 1.558
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.7261 0.0732 50.8970 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1359 0.0535 -2.5414 0.0111
Rank2E89 0.2097 0.1232 1.7024 0.0889
Rank2Ofc 0.3395 0.1030 3.2959 0.0010
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0910 0.0604 1.5056 0.1324
YrsExp16-20 0.0938 0.0623 1.5061 0.1322
YrsExp2-Jan 0.0945 0.0635 1.4874 0.1371
YrsExp20+ -0.0501 0.1149 -0.4357 0.6631
YrsExp5-Mar -0.0725 0.0546 -1.3282 0.1843
YrsExp<1 0.3402 0.0748 4.5477 0.0000
Shift -0.0909 0.0370 -2.4546 0.0142
ACNonTac 0.0390 0.0420 0.9284 0.3533
ACTactical -0.1518 0.0375 -4.0518 0.0001
Residual standard error: 0.6493 on 1715 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.08824
F-statistic: 13.83 on 12 and 1715 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
3 observations deleted due to missing values
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> QA2.lm_lm(QA2~Rank2+WC2+Status+YrsExp+Shift+AC, data=ahindivid, na.action=na.exclude)
> summary(QA2.lm)
Call: lm(formula = QA2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-3.006 -0.3789 0.05933 0.4407 1.472
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.7862 0.0994 38.0921 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1446 0.0562 -2.5717 0.0102
Rank2E89 0.1165 0.1283 0.9082 0.3639
Rank2Ofc 0.1763 0.1068 1.6503 0.0991
WC2Avionics -0.0405 0.0580 -0.6984 0.4850
WC2Flight Line 0.0859 0.0642 1.3389 0.1808
WC2Other 0.0942 0.0511 1.8453 0.0652
WC2Power Plants 0.1041 0.0744 1.3998 0.1618
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2073 0.0857 2.4179 0.0157
StatusRegular 0.0083 0.0549 0.1505 0.8804
YrsExp15-Nov 0.1349 0.0632 2.1336 0.0330
YrsExp16-20 0.1674 0.0655 2.5562 0.0107
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1763 0.0663 2.6598 0.0079
YrsExp20+ 0.2006 0.1198 1.6743 0.0942
YrsExp5-Mar 0.0290 0.0568 0.5111 0.6093
YrsExp<1 0.3271 0.0785 4.1673 0.0000
Shift -0.0790 0.0388 -2.0348 0.0420
ACNonTac -0.0024 0.0481 -0.0500 0.9601
ACTactical -0.1657 0.0391 -4.2407 0.0000
Residual standard error: 0.6723 on 1702 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.08277
F-statistic: 8.532 on 18 and 1702 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
10 observations deleted due to missing values
> QA2.lm.stepAIC_stepAIC(QA2.lm, trace=F)
> summary(QA2.lm.stepAIC)
Call: lm(formula = QA2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-3.006 -0.3789 0.05933 0.4407 1.472
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.7862 0.0994 38.0921 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1446 0.0562 -2.5717 0.0102
Rank2E89 0.1165 0.1283 0.9082 0.3639
Rank2Ofc 0.1763 0.1068 1.6503 0.0991
WC2Avionics -0.0405 0.0580 -0.6984 0.4850
WC2Flight Line 0.0859 0.0642 1.3389 0.1808
WC2Other 0.0942 0.0511 1.8453 0.0652
WC2Power Plants 0.1041 0.0744 1.3998 0.1618
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2073 0.0857 2.4179 0.0157
StatusRegular 0.0083 0.0549 0.1505 0.8804
YrsExp15-Nov 0.1349 0.0632 2.1336 0.0330
YrsExp16-20 0.1674 0.0655 2.5562 0.0107
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1763 0.0663 2.6598 0.0079
YrsExp20+ 0.2006 0.1198 1.6743 0.0942
YrsExp5-Mar 0.0290 0.0568 0.5111 0.6093
YrsExp<1 0.3271 0.0785 4.1673 0.0000
Shift -0.0790 0.0388 -2.0348 0.0420
ACNonTac -0.0024 0.0481 -0.0500 0.9601
ACTactical -0.1657 0.0391 -4.2407 0.0000
Residual standard error: 0.6723 on 1702 degrees of freedom
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Multiple R-Squared: 0.08277
F-statistic: 8.532 on 18 and 1702 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
10 observations deleted due to missing values
> RM2.lm_lm(RM2~Rank2+WC2+Status+YrsExp+Shift+AC, data=ahindivid, na.action=na.exclude)
summary(RM2.lm)
Call: lm(formula = RM2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.55 -0.3505 0.04374 0.3884 1.696
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.3977 0.0870 39.0387 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1820 0.0492 -3.6982 0.0002
Rank2E89 0.0035 0.1127 0.0311 0.9752
Rank2Ofc -0.0668 0.0939 -0.7121 0.4765
WC2Avionics -0.0435 0.0509 -0.8549 0.3927
WC2Flight Line 0.0736 0.0564 1.3052 0.1920
WC2Other -0.0316 0.0448 -0.7044 0.4813
WC2Power Plants 0.0699 0.0654 1.0697 0.2849
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2024 0.0747 2.7096 0.0068
StatusRegular 0.0744 0.0482 1.5456 0.1224
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0521 0.0554 0.9403 0.3472
YrsExp16-20 0.0214 0.0573 0.3742 0.7083
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1310 0.0580 2.2584 0.0240
YrsExp20+ -0.1295 0.1052 -1.2309 0.2185
YrsExp5-Mar 0.0448 0.0498 0.9010 0.3677
YrsExp<1 0.3831 0.0685 5.5963 0.0000
Shift -0.1547 0.0341 -4.5341 0.0000
ACNonTac 0.1019 0.0421 2.4197 0.0156
ACTactical -0.1130 0.0343 -3.2924 0.0010
Residual standard error: 0.591 on 1712 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.117
F-statistic: 12.6 on 18 and 1712 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
> RM2.lm.stepAIC_stepAIC(RM2.lm, trace=F)
> summary(RM2.lm.stepAIC)
Call: lm(formula = RM2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.55 -0.3505 0.04374 0.3884 1.696
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.3977 0.0870 39.0387 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1820 0.0492 -3.6982 0.0002
Rank2E89 0.0035 0.1127 0.0311 0.9752
Rank2Ofc -0.0668 0.0939 -0.7121 0.4765
WC2Avionics -0.0435 0.0509 -0.8549 0.3927
WC2Flight Line 0.0736 0.0564 1.3052 0.1920
WC2Other -0.0316 0.0448 -0.7044 0.4813
WC2Power Plants 0.0699 0.0654 1.0697 0.2849
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2024 0.0747 2.7096 0.0068
StatusRegular 0.0744 0.0482 1.5456 0.1224
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0521 0.0554 0.9403 0.3472
YrsExp16-20 0.0214 0.0573 0.3742 0.7083
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1310 0.0580 2.2584 0.0240
YrsExp20+ -0.1295 0.1052 -1.2309 0.2185
YrsExp5-Mar 0.0448 0.0498 0.9010 0.3677
YrsExp<1 0.3831 0.0685 5.5963 0.0000
Shift -0.1547 0.0341 -4.5341 0.0000
ACNonTac 0.1019 0.0421 2.4197 0.0156
ACTactical -0.1130 0.0343 -3.2924 0.0010
Residual standard error: 0.591 on 1712 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.117
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F-statistic: 12.6 on 18 and 1712 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
> CC2.lm_lm(CC2~Rank2+WC2+Status+YrsExp+Shift+AC, data=ahindivid, na.action=na.exclude)
> summary(CC2.lm)
Call: lm(formula = CC2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-3.078 -0.3259 0.08156 0.3769 1.727
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.6136 0.0930 38.8633 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1293 0.0525 -2.4597 0.0140
Rank2E89 0.2204 0.1202 1.8326 0.0670
Rank2Ofc 0.2199 0.1001 2.1955 0.0283
WC2Avionics -0.0392 0.0543 -0.7222 0.4703
WC2Flight Line 0.0717 0.0602 1.1923 0.2333
WC2Other 0.0525 0.0479 1.0975 0.2726
WC2Power Plants 0.0351 0.0697 0.5029 0.6151
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2109 0.0797 2.6464 0.0082
StatusRegular 0.0862 0.0515 1.6753 0.0941
YrsExp15-Nov 0.1019 0.0592 1.7203 0.0856
YrsExp16-20 0.0242 0.0612 0.3962 0.6920
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1405 0.0620 2.2652 0.0236
YrsExp20+ -0.0530 0.1123 -0.4719 0.6371
YrsExp5-Mar 0.0594 0.0532 1.1166 0.2643
YrsExp<1 0.3835 0.0732 5.2428 0.0000
Shift -0.0966 0.0364 -2.6518 0.0081
ACNonTac 0.0711 0.0451 1.5761 0.1152
ACTactical -0.1723 0.0366 -4.7063 0.0000
Residual standard error: 0.6305 on 1708 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.09352
F-statistic: 9.79 on 18 and 1708 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
4 observations deleted due to missing values
> CC2.lm.stepAIC_stepAIC(CC2.lm, trace=F)
> summary(CC2.lm.stepAIC)
Call: lm(formula = CC2 ~ Rank2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-3.057 -0.3336 0.07561 0.3825 1.659
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.6467 0.0840 43.3994 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1356 0.0519 -2.6141 0.0090
Rank2E89 0.2223 0.1197 1.8576 0.0634
Rank2Ofc 0.2288 0.0990 2.3114 0.0209
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2025 0.0797 2.5426 0.0111
StatusRegular 0.0796 0.0514 1.5486 0.1217
YrsExp15-Nov 0.1137 0.0588 1.9322 0.0535
YrsExp16-20 0.0410 0.0605 0.6777 0.4981
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1463 0.0619 2.3630 0.0182
YrsExp20+ -0.0315 0.1119 -0.2817 0.7782
YrsExp5-Mar 0.0617 0.0532 1.1604 0.2461
YrsExp<1 0.4007 0.0728 5.5068 0.0000
Shift -0.1031 0.0363 -2.8357 0.0046
ACNonTac 0.0654 0.0450 1.4531 0.1464
ACTactical -0.1698 0.0364 -4.6653 0.0000
Residual standard error: 0.6309 on 1712 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.09034
F-statistic: 12.14 on 14 and 1712 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
4 observations deleted due to missing values
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> CF2.lm_lm(CF2~Rank2+WC2+Status+YrsExp+Shift+AC, data=ahindivid, na.action=na.exclude)
> summary(CF2.lm)
Call: lm(formula = CF2 ~ Rank2 + WC2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.795 -0.3464 0.07876 0.4184 1.614
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.6967 0.0972 38.0141 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1437 0.0550 -2.6146 0.0090
Rank2E89 0.0316 0.1258 0.2511 0.8018
Rank2Ofc 0.1680 0.1047 1.6037 0.1090
WC2Avionics -0.0260 0.0568 -0.4573 0.6475
WC2Flight Line 0.0917 0.0629 1.4572 0.1452
WC2Other 0.0148 0.0501 0.2958 0.7674
WC2Power Plants 0.1018 0.0729 1.3954 0.1631
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2194 0.0841 2.6097 0.0091
StatusRegular 0.0158 0.0538 0.2934 0.7693
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0062 0.0619 0.0993 0.9209
YrsExp16-20 0.0201 0.0640 0.3141 0.7535
YrsExp2-Jan 0.0974 0.0649 1.5006 0.1336
YrsExp20+ 0.0132 0.1175 0.1120 0.9109
YrsExp5-Mar -0.0069 0.0556 -0.1234 0.9018
YrsExp<1 0.3376 0.0765 4.4128 0.0000
Shift -0.1436 0.0381 -3.7692 0.0002
ACNonTac -0.0063 0.0471 -0.1343 0.8932
ACTactical -0.2032 0.0383 -5.3069 0.0000
Residual standard error: 0.6595 on 1708 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.09417
F-statistic: 9.864 on 18 and 1708 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
4 observations deleted due to missing values
> CF2.lm.stepAIC_stepAIC(CF2.lm, trace=F)
> summary(CF2.lm.stepAIC)
Call: lm(formula = CF2 ~ Rank2 + Status + YrsExp + Shift + AC, data = ahindivid,
na.action = na.exclude)
Residuals:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-2.743 -0.3506 0.08261 0.4158 1.598
Coefficients:
Value Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) 3.7351 0.0879 42.4968 0.0000
Rank2E47 -0.1588 0.0543 -2.9268 0.0035
Rank2E89 0.0135 0.1252 0.1081 0.9139
Rank2Ofc 0.1511 0.1035 1.4593 0.1447
StatusDrilling Reserve 0.2153 0.0840 2.5625 0.0105
StatusRegular 0.0108 0.0537 0.2001 0.8415
YrsExp15-Nov 0.0068 0.0616 0.1101 0.9124
YrsExp16-20 0.0221 0.0633 0.3496 0.7267
YrsExp2-Jan 0.1019 0.0647 1.5739 0.1157
YrsExp20+ 0.0174 0.1170 0.1488 0.8817
YrsExp5-Mar -0.0030 0.0556 -0.0534 0.9574
YrsExp<1 0.3510 0.0761 4.6126 0.0000
Shift -0.1469 0.0380 -3.8655 0.0001
ACNonTac -0.0142 0.0470 -0.3026 0.7622
ACTactical -0.2075 0.0381 -5.4524 0.0000
Residual standard error: 0.6599 on 1712 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-Squared: 0.09096
F-statistic: 12.24 on 14 and 1712 degrees of freedom, the p-value is 0
4 observations deleted due to missing values
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